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/*
* lib/crypto/nss/pbkdf2.c
*
* Copyright 2002, 2008, 2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* Export of this software from the United States of America may
* require a specific license from the United States Government.
* It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
* export to obtain such a license before exporting.
*
* WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
* distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
* without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
* notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
* this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
* the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
* to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
* permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
* your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
* fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
* M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
* this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
* or implied warranty.
*
*
* Implementation of PBKDF2 from RFC 2898.
* Not currently used; likely to be used when we get around to AES support.
*/
#include <ctype.h>
#include "k5-int.h"
#include "hash_provider.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "nss_gen.h"
krb5_error_code
krb5int_pbkdf2_hmac_sha1 (const krb5_data *out, unsigned long count,
const krb5_data *pass, const krb5_data *salt)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
SECAlgorithmID *algid = NULL;
PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
SECItem saltItem, pwItem;
const SECItem *keydata = NULL;
SECOidTag pbeAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2;
SECOidTag cipherAlg = SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC;
SECOidTag prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = k5_nss_init();
if (ret) return ret;
slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(pbeAlg), NULL);
if (slot == NULL) {
return k5_nss_map_last_error();
}
saltItem.type = siBuffer;
saltItem.data = (unsigned char *)salt->data;
saltItem.len = salt->length;
/* PKCS 5 was designed to be DER encoded. Algid's carry all the
* information needed to describe the encoding the the recipient.
* This usually allows for crypto agility in the protocol automatically.
* Kerberos already had to solve it's crypto agility issues, so the
* algid is just and extra step we need that we will throw away */
algid = PK11_CreatePBEV2AlgorithmID(pbeAlg, cipherAlg, prfAlg,
out->length, count, &saltItem);
if (algid == NULL) {
ret = k5_nss_map_last_error();
goto loser;
}
pwItem.type = siBuffer;
pwItem.data = (unsigned char *)pass->data;
pwItem.len = pass->length;
symKey = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, algid, &pwItem, PR_FALSE, NULL);
if (symKey == NULL) {
ret = k5_nss_map_last_error();
goto loser;
}
/* at this point we should return symKey as a key, but kerberos is
* still passing bits around instead of key handles */
PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey);
/* keydata here is a const * and is valid as long as the key has not been
* destroyed. */
keydata = PK11_GetKeyData(symKey);
if (keydata == NULL) {
ret = k5_nss_map_last_error();
goto loser;
}
if (out->length != keydata->len) {
ret = -1; /* XXXXX */
goto loser;
}
memcpy(out->data, keydata->data, keydata->len);
ret = 0;
loser:
if (symKey) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
}
if (algid) {
SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(algid, PR_TRUE);
}
if (slot) {
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
return ret;
}
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