/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */ /* * Copyright 1993 OpenVision Technologies, Inc., All Rights Reserved * * $Header$ */ #include "k5-int.h" #include #include #include #include "server_internal.h" #ifdef USE_PASSWORD_SERVER #include #include #endif #include #ifdef USE_VALGRIND #include #else #define VALGRIND_CHECK_DEFINED(LVALUE) ((void)0) #endif extern krb5_principal master_princ; extern krb5_principal hist_princ; extern krb5_keyblock master_keyblock; extern krb5_db_entry master_db; static int decrypt_key_data(krb5_context context, int n_key_data, krb5_key_data *key_data, krb5_keyblock **keyblocks, int *n_keys); static krb5_error_code kadm5_copy_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal inprinc, krb5_principal *outprinc) { register krb5_principal tempprinc; register int i, nelems; tempprinc = (krb5_principal)krb5_db_alloc(context, NULL, sizeof(krb5_principal_data)); if (tempprinc == 0) return ENOMEM; VALGRIND_CHECK_DEFINED(*inprinc); *tempprinc = *inprinc; nelems = (int) krb5_princ_size(context, inprinc); tempprinc->data = krb5_db_alloc(context, NULL, nelems * sizeof(krb5_data)); if (tempprinc->data == 0) { krb5_db_free(context, (char *)tempprinc); return ENOMEM; } for (i = 0; i < nelems; i++) { unsigned int len = krb5_princ_component(context, inprinc, i)->length; krb5_princ_component(context, tempprinc, i)->length = len; if (((krb5_princ_component(context, tempprinc, i)->data = krb5_db_alloc(context, NULL, len)) == 0) && len) { while (--i >= 0) krb5_db_free(context, krb5_princ_component(context, tempprinc, i)->data); krb5_db_free (context, tempprinc->data); krb5_db_free (context, tempprinc); return ENOMEM; } if (len) memcpy(krb5_princ_component(context, tempprinc, i)->data, krb5_princ_component(context, inprinc, i)->data, len); krb5_princ_component(context, tempprinc, i)->magic = KV5M_DATA; } tempprinc->realm.data = krb5_db_alloc(context, NULL, tempprinc->realm.length = inprinc->realm.length); if (!tempprinc->realm.data && tempprinc->realm.length) { for (i = 0; i < nelems; i++) krb5_db_free(context, krb5_princ_component(context, tempprinc, i)->data); krb5_db_free(context, tempprinc->data); krb5_db_free(context, tempprinc); return ENOMEM; } if (tempprinc->realm.length) memcpy(tempprinc->realm.data, inprinc->realm.data, inprinc->realm.length); *outprinc = tempprinc; return 0; } static void kadm5_free_principal(krb5_context context, krb5_principal val) { register krb5_int32 i; if (!val) return; if (val->data) { i = krb5_princ_size(context, val); while(--i >= 0) krb5_db_free(context, krb5_princ_component(context, val, i)->data); krb5_db_free(context, val->data); } if (val->realm.data) krb5_db_free(context, val->realm.data); krb5_db_free(context, val); } /* * XXX Functions that ought to be in libkrb5.a, but aren't. */ kadm5_ret_t krb5_copy_key_data_contents(context, from, to) krb5_context context; krb5_key_data *from, *to; { int i, idx; *to = *from; idx = (from->key_data_ver == 1 ? 1 : 2); for (i = 0; i < idx; i++) { if ( from->key_data_length[i] ) { to->key_data_contents[i] = malloc(from->key_data_length[i]); if (to->key_data_contents[i] == NULL) { for (i = 0; i < idx; i++) { if (to->key_data_contents[i]) { memset(to->key_data_contents[i], 0, to->key_data_length[i]); free(to->key_data_contents[i]); } } return ENOMEM; } memcpy(to->key_data_contents[i], from->key_data_contents[i], from->key_data_length[i]); } } return 0; } static krb5_tl_data *dup_tl_data(krb5_tl_data *tl) { krb5_tl_data *n; n = (krb5_tl_data *) malloc(sizeof(krb5_tl_data)); if (n == NULL) return NULL; n->tl_data_contents = malloc(tl->tl_data_length); if (n->tl_data_contents == NULL) { free(n); return NULL; } memcpy(n->tl_data_contents, tl->tl_data_contents, tl->tl_data_length); n->tl_data_type = tl->tl_data_type; n->tl_data_length = tl->tl_data_length; n->tl_data_next = NULL; return n; } /* This is in lib/kdb/kdb_cpw.c, but is static */ static void cleanup_key_data(context, count, data) krb5_context context; int count; krb5_key_data * data; { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) for (j = 0; j < data[i].key_data_ver; j++) if (data[i].key_data_length[j]) krb5_db_free(context, data[i].key_data_contents[j]); krb5_db_free(context, data); } /* Check whether a ks_tuple is present in an array of ks_tuples. */ static krb5_boolean ks_tuple_present(int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *looking_for) { int i; for (i = 0; i < n_ks_tuple; i++) { if (ks_tuple[i].ks_enctype == looking_for->ks_enctype && ks_tuple[i].ks_salttype == looking_for->ks_salttype) return TRUE; } return FALSE; } /* Fetch a policy if it exists; set *have_pol_out appropriately. Return * success whether or not the policy exists. */ static kadm5_ret_t get_policy(kadm5_server_handle_t handle, const char *name, kadm5_policy_ent_t policy_out, krb5_boolean *have_pol_out) { kadm5_ret_t ret; *have_pol_out = FALSE; if (name == NULL) return 0; ret = kadm5_get_policy(handle->lhandle, (char *)name, policy_out); if (ret == 0) *have_pol_out = TRUE; return (ret == KADM5_UNK_POLICY) ? 0 : ret; } /* * Apply the -allowedkeysalts policy (see kadmin(1)'s addpol/modpol * commands). We use the allowed key/salt tuple list as a default if * no ks tuples as provided by the caller. We reject lists that include * key/salts outside the policy. We re-order the requested ks tuples * (which may be a subset of the policy) to reflect the policy order. */ static kadm5_ret_t apply_keysalt_policy(kadm5_server_handle_t handle, const char *policy, int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, int *new_n_kstp, krb5_key_salt_tuple **new_kstp) { kadm5_ret_t ret; kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent; krb5_boolean have_polent; int ak_n_ks_tuple = 0; int new_n_ks_tuple = 0; krb5_key_salt_tuple *ak_ks_tuple = NULL; krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL; krb5_key_salt_tuple *subset; int i, m; if (new_n_kstp != NULL) { *new_n_kstp = 0; *new_kstp = NULL; } memset(&polent, 0, sizeof(polent)); ret = get_policy(handle, policy, &polent, &have_polent); if (ret) goto cleanup; if (polent.allowed_keysalts == NULL) { /* Requested keysalts allowed or default to supported_enctypes. */ if (n_ks_tuple == 0) { /* Default to supported_enctypes. */ n_ks_tuple = handle->params.num_keysalts; ks_tuple = handle->params.keysalts; } /* Dup the requested or defaulted keysalt tuples. */ new_ks_tuple = malloc(n_ks_tuple * sizeof(*new_ks_tuple)); if (new_ks_tuple == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } memcpy(new_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, n_ks_tuple * sizeof(*new_ks_tuple)); new_n_ks_tuple = n_ks_tuple; ret = 0; goto cleanup; } ret = krb5_string_to_keysalts(polent.allowed_keysalts, ",", /* Tuple separators */ NULL, /* Key/salt separators */ 0, /* No duplicates */ &ak_ks_tuple, &ak_n_ks_tuple); /* * Malformed policy? Shouldn't happen, but it's remotely possible * someday, so we don't assert, just bail. */ if (ret) goto cleanup; /* Check that the requested ks_tuples are within policy, if we have one. */ for (i = 0; i < n_ks_tuple; i++) { if (!ks_tuple_present(ak_n_ks_tuple, ak_ks_tuple, &ks_tuple[i])) { ret = KADM5_BAD_KEYSALTS; goto cleanup; } } /* Have policy but no ks_tuple input? Output the policy. */ if (n_ks_tuple == 0) { new_n_ks_tuple = ak_n_ks_tuple; new_ks_tuple = ak_ks_tuple; ak_ks_tuple = NULL; goto cleanup; } /* * Now filter the policy ks tuples by the requested ones so as to * preserve in the requested sub-set the relative ordering from the * policy. We could optimize this (if (n_ks_tuple == ak_n_ks_tuple) * then skip this), but we don't bother. */ subset = calloc(n_ks_tuple, sizeof(*subset)); if (subset == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } for (m = 0, i = 0; i < ak_n_ks_tuple && m < n_ks_tuple; i++) { if (ks_tuple_present(n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &ak_ks_tuple[i])) subset[m++] = ak_ks_tuple[i]; } new_ks_tuple = subset; new_n_ks_tuple = m; ret = 0; cleanup: if (have_polent) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent); free(ak_ks_tuple); if (new_n_kstp != NULL) { *new_n_kstp = new_n_ks_tuple; *new_kstp = new_ks_tuple; } else { free(new_ks_tuple); } return ret; } /* * Set *passptr to NULL if the request looks like the first part of a krb5 1.6 * addprinc -randkey operation. The krb5 1.6 dummy password for these requests * was invalid UTF-8, which runs afoul of the arcfour string-to-key. */ static void check_1_6_dummy(kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask, int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, char **passptr) { int i; char *password = *passptr; /* Old-style randkey operations disallowed tickets to start. */ if (password == NULL || !(mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) || !(entry->attributes & KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX)) return; /* The 1.6 dummy password was the octets 1..255. */ for (i = 0; (unsigned char) password[i] == i + 1; i++); if (password[i] != '\0' || i != 255) return; /* This will make the caller use a random password instead. */ *passptr = NULL; } /* Return the number of keys with the newest kvno. Assumes that all key data * with the newest kvno are at the front of the key data array. */ static int count_new_keys(int n_key_data, krb5_key_data *key_data) { int n; for (n = 1; n < n_key_data; n++) { if (key_data[n - 1].key_data_kvno != key_data[n].key_data_kvno) return n; } return n_key_data; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_create_principal(void *server_handle, kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask, char *password) { return kadm5_create_principal_3(server_handle, entry, mask, 0, NULL, password); } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle, kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask, int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, char *password) { krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent; krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE; krb5_int32 now; krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail; unsigned int ret; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; krb5_keyblock *act_mkey; krb5_kvno act_kvno; int new_n_ks_tuple = 0; krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password); /* * Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB */ if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) || (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) || (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT)) return KADM5_BAD_MASK; if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0) return KADM5_BAD_MASK; if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR)) return KADM5_BAD_MASK; if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK)) return KADM5_BAD_MASK; if (entry == NULL) return EINVAL; /* * Check to see if the principal exists */ ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb); switch(ret) { case KADM5_UNK_PRINC: break; case 0: kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return KADM5_DUP; default: return ret; } kdb = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, sizeof(*kdb)); if (kdb == NULL) return ENOMEM; memset(kdb, 0, sizeof(*kdb)); memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec)); /* * If a policy was specified, load it. * If we can not find the one specified return an error */ if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) { ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent); if (ret) goto cleanup; } if (password) { ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL, entry->principal); if (ret) goto cleanup; } /* * Start populating the various DB fields, using the * "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the * mask. */ if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now))) goto cleanup; kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER; kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */ if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES)) kdb->attributes = entry->attributes; else kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags; if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE)) kdb->max_life = entry->max_life; else kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life; if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life; else kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife; if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME)) kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time; else kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration; kdb->pw_expiration = 0; if (have_polent) { if(polent.pw_max_life) kdb->pw_expiration = now + polent.pw_max_life; else kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION)) kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration; kdb->last_success = 0; kdb->last_failed = 0; kdb->fail_auth_count = 0; /* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the principal. */ if ((ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context, entry->principal, &(kdb->princ)))) goto cleanup; if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now))) goto cleanup; if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { /* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */ for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail; tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next) { ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail); if( ret ) goto cleanup; } } /* * We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can * check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple * this late. */ ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple); if (ret) goto cleanup; /* initialize the keys */ ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey); if (ret) goto cleanup; if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { /* The client requested no keys for this principal. */ assert(entry->n_key_data == 0); } else if (password) { ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, password, (mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1, FALSE, kdb); } else { /* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */ ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb); } if (ret) goto cleanup; /* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */ ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno); if (ret) goto cleanup; ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password); if (ret) goto cleanup; /* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server, this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple, I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a single tl_data record, */ adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO; if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) { adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY; /* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */ /* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */ adb.policy = entry->policy; } /* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */ kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ; /* store the new db entry */ ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); (void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password); cleanup: free(new_ks_tuple); krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb); if (have_polent) (void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent); return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_delete_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal) { unsigned int ret; krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); if (principal == NULL) return EINVAL; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb))) return(ret); ret = k5_kadm5_hook_remove(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal); if (ret) { kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return ret; } ret = kdb_delete_entry(handle, principal); kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); if (ret == 0) (void) k5_kadm5_hook_remove(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal); return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle, kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask) { int ret, ret2, i; kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol; krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE; krb5_db_entry *kdb; krb5_tl_data *tl_data_orig; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); if((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) || (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) || (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED)) return KADM5_BAD_MASK; if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK)) return KADM5_BAD_MASK; if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR)) return KADM5_BAD_MASK; if(entry == (kadm5_principal_ent_t) NULL) return EINVAL; if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { tl_data_orig = entry->tl_data; while (tl_data_orig) { if (tl_data_orig->tl_data_type < 256) return KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE; tl_data_orig = tl_data_orig->tl_data_next; } } ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb); if (ret) return(ret); /* * This is pretty much the same as create ... */ if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) { ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &pol, &have_pol); if (ret) goto done; /* set us up to use the new policy */ adb.aux_attributes |= KADM5_POLICY; if (adb.policy) free(adb.policy); adb.policy = strdup(entry->policy); } if (have_pol) { /* set pw_max_life based on new policy */ if (pol.pw_max_life) { ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &(kdb->pw_expiration)); if (ret) goto done; kdb->pw_expiration += pol.pw_max_life; } else { kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } } if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR) && (adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) { free(adb.policy); adb.policy = NULL; adb.aux_attributes &= ~KADM5_POLICY; kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES)) kdb->attributes = entry->attributes; if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE)) kdb->max_life = entry->max_life; if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME)) kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time; if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration; if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life; if((mask & KADM5_KVNO)) { for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++) kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno = entry->kvno; } if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { krb5_tl_data *tl; /* may have to change the version number of the API. Updates the list with the given tl_data rather than over-writting */ for (tl = entry->tl_data; tl; tl = tl->tl_data_next) { ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl); if( ret ) { goto done; } } } /* * Setting entry->fail_auth_count to 0 can be used to manually unlock * an account. It is not possible to set fail_auth_count to any other * value using kadmin. */ if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) { if (entry->fail_auth_count != 0) { ret = KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS; goto done; } kdb->fail_auth_count = 0; } /* let the mask propagate to the database provider */ kdb->mask = mask; ret = k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask); if (ret) goto done; ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); if (ret) goto done; (void) k5_kadm5_hook_modify(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask); ret = KADM5_OK; done: if (have_pol) { ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol); ret = ret ? ret : ret2; } kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_rename_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal source, krb5_principal target) { krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; krb5_error_code ret; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; krb5_int16 stype, i; krb5_data *salt = NULL; krb5_tl_data tl; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); if (source == NULL || target == NULL) return EINVAL; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, target, &kdb, &adb)) == 0) { kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return(KADM5_DUP); } if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, source, &kdb, &adb))) return ret; /* * This rename procedure does not work with the LDAP KDB module (see issue * #8065). As a stopgap, look for tl-data indicating LDAP and error out. * 0x7FFE is KDB_TL_USER_INFO as defined in kdb_ldap.h. */ tl.tl_data_type = 0x7FFE; if (krb5_dbe_lookup_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, &tl) == 0 && tl.tl_data_length > 0) { ret = KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP; goto done; } /* Transform salts as necessary. */ for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++) { ret = krb5_dbe_compute_salt(handle->context, &kdb->key_data[i], kdb->princ, &stype, &salt); if (ret == KRB5_KDB_BAD_SALTTYPE) ret = KADM5_NO_RENAME_SALT; if (ret) goto done; kdb->key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_SPECIAL; free(kdb->key_data[i].key_data_contents[1]); kdb->key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = (krb5_octet *)salt->data; kdb->key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = salt->length; kdb->key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2; free(salt); salt = NULL; } kadm5_free_principal(handle->context, kdb->princ); ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context, target, &kdb->princ); if (ret) { kdb->princ = NULL; /* so freeing the dbe doesn't lose */ goto done; } if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb))) goto done; ret = kdb_delete_entry(handle, source); done: krb5_free_data(handle->context, salt); kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_get_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long in_mask) { krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; krb5_error_code ret = 0; long mask; int i; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); /* * In version 1, all the defined fields are always returned. * entry is a pointer to a kadm5_principal_ent_t_v1 that should be * filled with allocated memory. */ mask = in_mask; memset(entry, 0, sizeof(*entry)); if (principal == NULL) return EINVAL; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb))) return ret; if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && adb.policy && (adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) { if ((entry->policy = strdup(adb.policy)) == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto done; } } if (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) entry->aux_attributes = adb.aux_attributes; if ((mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) && (ret = krb5_copy_principal(handle->context, kdb->princ, &entry->principal))) { goto done; } if (mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME) entry->princ_expire_time = kdb->expiration; if ((mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) && (ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &(entry->last_pwd_change)))) { goto done; } if (mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION) entry->pw_expiration = kdb->pw_expiration; if (mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE) entry->max_life = kdb->max_life; /* this is a little non-sensical because the function returns two */ /* values that must be checked separately against the mask */ if ((mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME)) { ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_mod_princ_data(handle->context, kdb, &(entry->mod_date), &(entry->mod_name)); if (ret) { goto done; } if (! (mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME)) entry->mod_date = 0; if (! (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME)) { krb5_free_principal(handle->context, entry->mod_name); entry->mod_name = NULL; } } if (mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES) entry->attributes = kdb->attributes; if (mask & KADM5_KVNO) for (entry->kvno = 0, i=0; in_key_data; i++) if ((krb5_kvno) kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno > entry->kvno) entry->kvno = kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno; if (mask & KADM5_MKVNO) { ret = krb5_dbe_get_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, &entry->mkvno); if (ret) goto done; } if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE) entry->max_renewable_life = kdb->max_renewable_life; if (mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) entry->last_success = kdb->last_success; if (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) entry->last_failed = kdb->last_failed; if (mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT) entry->fail_auth_count = kdb->fail_auth_count; if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) { krb5_tl_data *tl, *tl2; entry->tl_data = NULL; tl = kdb->tl_data; while (tl) { if (tl->tl_data_type > 255) { if ((tl2 = dup_tl_data(tl)) == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto done; } tl2->tl_data_next = entry->tl_data; entry->tl_data = tl2; entry->n_tl_data++; } tl = tl->tl_data_next; } } if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) { entry->n_key_data = kdb->n_key_data; if(entry->n_key_data) { entry->key_data = k5calloc(entry->n_key_data, sizeof(krb5_key_data), &ret); if (entry->key_data == NULL) goto done; } else entry->key_data = NULL; for (i = 0; i < entry->n_key_data; i++) ret = krb5_copy_key_data_contents(handle->context, &kdb->key_data[i], &entry->key_data[i]); if (ret) goto done; } ret = KADM5_OK; done: if (ret && entry->principal) { krb5_free_principal(handle->context, entry->principal); entry->principal = NULL; } kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return ret; } /* * Function: check_pw_reuse * * Purpose: Check if a key appears in a list of keys, in order to * enforce password history. * * Arguments: * * context (r) the krb5 context * hist_keyblock (r) the key that hist_key_data is * encrypted in * n_new_key_data (r) length of new_key_data * new_key_data (r) keys to check against * pw_hist_data, encrypted in hist_keyblock * n_pw_hist_data (r) length of pw_hist_data * pw_hist_data (r) passwords to check new_key_data against * * Effects: * For each new_key in new_key_data: * decrypt new_key with the master_keyblock * for each password in pw_hist_data: * for each hist_key in password: * decrypt hist_key with hist_keyblock * compare the new_key and hist_key * * Returns krb5 errors, KADM5_PASS_RESUSE if a key in * new_key_data is the same as a key in pw_hist_data, or 0. */ static kadm5_ret_t check_pw_reuse(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *hist_keyblocks, int n_new_key_data, krb5_key_data *new_key_data, unsigned int n_pw_hist_data, osa_pw_hist_ent *pw_hist_data) { unsigned int x, y, z; krb5_keyblock newkey, histkey, *kb; krb5_key_data *key_data; krb5_error_code ret; assert (n_new_key_data >= 0); for (x = 0; x < (unsigned) n_new_key_data; x++) { /* Check only entries with the most recent kvno. */ if (new_key_data[x].key_data_kvno != new_key_data[0].key_data_kvno) break; ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, &(new_key_data[x]), &newkey, NULL); if (ret) return(ret); for (y = 0; y < n_pw_hist_data; y++) { for (z = 0; z < (unsigned int) pw_hist_data[y].n_key_data; z++) { for (kb = hist_keyblocks; kb->enctype != 0; kb++) { key_data = &pw_hist_data[y].key_data[z]; ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, kb, key_data, &histkey, NULL); if (ret) continue; if (newkey.length == histkey.length && newkey.enctype == histkey.enctype && memcmp(newkey.contents, histkey.contents, histkey.length) == 0) { krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &histkey); krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &newkey); return KADM5_PASS_REUSE; } krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &histkey); } } } krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &newkey); } return(0); } /* * Function: create_history_entry * * Purpose: Creates a password history entry from an array of * key_data. * * Arguments: * * context (r) krb5_context to use * mkey (r) master keyblock to decrypt key data with * hist_key (r) history keyblock to encrypt key data with * n_key_data (r) number of elements in key_data * key_data (r) keys to add to the history entry * hist (w) history entry to fill in * * Effects: * * hist->key_data is allocated to store n_key_data key_datas. Each * element of key_data is decrypted with master_keyblock, re-encrypted * in hist_key, and added to hist->key_data. hist->n_key_data is * set to n_key_data. */ static int create_history_entry(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *hist_key, int n_key_data, krb5_key_data *key_data, osa_pw_hist_ent *hist) { krb5_error_code ret; krb5_keyblock key; krb5_keysalt salt; int i; hist->key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(krb5_key_data), &ret); if (hist->key_data == NULL) return ret; for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) { ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, &key_data[i], &key, &salt); if (ret) return ret; ret = krb5_dbe_encrypt_key_data(context, hist_key, &key, &salt, key_data[i].key_data_kvno, &hist->key_data[i]); if (ret) return ret; krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key); /* krb5_free_keysalt(context, &salt); */ } hist->n_key_data = n_key_data; return 0; } static void free_history_entry(krb5_context context, osa_pw_hist_ent *hist) { int i; for (i = 0; i < hist->n_key_data; i++) krb5_free_key_data_contents(context, &hist->key_data[i]); free(hist->key_data); } /* * Function: add_to_history * * Purpose: Adds a password to a principal's password history. * * Arguments: * * context (r) krb5_context to use * hist_kvno (r) kvno of current history key * adb (r/w) admin principal entry to add keys to * pol (r) adb's policy * pw (r) keys for the password to add to adb's key history * * Effects: * * add_to_history adds a single password to adb's password history. * pw contains n_key_data keys in its key_data, in storage should be * allocated but not freed by the caller (XXX blech!). * * This function maintains adb->old_keys as a circular queue. It * starts empty, and grows each time this function is called until it * is pol->pw_history_num items long. adb->old_key_len holds the * number of allocated entries in the array, and must therefore be [0, * pol->pw_history_num). adb->old_key_next is the index into the * array where the next element should be written, and must be [0, * adb->old_key_len). */ static kadm5_ret_t add_to_history(krb5_context context, krb5_kvno hist_kvno, osa_princ_ent_t adb, kadm5_policy_ent_t pol, osa_pw_hist_ent *pw) { osa_pw_hist_ent *histp; uint32_t nhist; unsigned int i, knext, nkeys; nhist = pol->pw_history_num; /* A history of 1 means just check the current password */ if (nhist <= 1) return 0; if (adb->admin_history_kvno != hist_kvno) { /* The history key has changed since the last password change, so we * have to reset the password history. */ free(adb->old_keys); adb->old_keys = NULL; adb->old_key_len = 0; adb->old_key_next = 0; adb->admin_history_kvno = hist_kvno; } nkeys = adb->old_key_len; knext = adb->old_key_next; /* resize the adb->old_keys array if necessary */ if (nkeys + 1 < nhist) { if (adb->old_keys == NULL) { adb->old_keys = (osa_pw_hist_ent *) malloc((nkeys + 1) * sizeof (osa_pw_hist_ent)); } else { adb->old_keys = (osa_pw_hist_ent *) realloc(adb->old_keys, (nkeys + 1) * sizeof (osa_pw_hist_ent)); } if (adb->old_keys == NULL) return(ENOMEM); memset(&adb->old_keys[nkeys], 0, sizeof(osa_pw_hist_ent)); nkeys = ++adb->old_key_len; /* * To avoid losing old keys, shift forward each entry after * knext. */ for (i = nkeys - 1; i > knext; i--) { adb->old_keys[i] = adb->old_keys[i - 1]; } memset(&adb->old_keys[knext], 0, sizeof(osa_pw_hist_ent)); } else if (nkeys + 1 > nhist) { /* * The policy must have changed! Shrink the array. * Can't simply realloc() down, since it might be wrapped. * To understand the arithmetic below, note that we are * copying into new positions 0 .. N-1 from old positions * old_key_next-N .. old_key_next-1, modulo old_key_len, * where N = pw_history_num - 1 is the length of the * shortened list. Matt Crawford, FNAL */ /* * M = adb->old_key_len, N = pol->pw_history_num - 1 * * tmp[0] .. tmp[N-1] = old[(knext-N)%M] .. old[(knext-1)%M] */ int j; osa_pw_hist_t tmp; tmp = (osa_pw_hist_ent *) malloc((nhist - 1) * sizeof (osa_pw_hist_ent)); if (tmp == NULL) return ENOMEM; for (i = 0; i < nhist - 1; i++) { /* * Add nkeys once before taking remainder to avoid * negative values. */ j = (i + nkeys + knext - (nhist - 1)) % nkeys; tmp[i] = adb->old_keys[j]; } /* Now free the ones we don't keep (the oldest ones) */ for (i = 0; i < nkeys - (nhist - 1); i++) { j = (i + nkeys + knext) % nkeys; histp = &adb->old_keys[j]; for (j = 0; j < histp->n_key_data; j++) { krb5_free_key_data_contents(context, &histp->key_data[j]); } free(histp->key_data); } free(adb->old_keys); adb->old_keys = tmp; nkeys = adb->old_key_len = nhist - 1; knext = adb->old_key_next = 0; } /* * If nhist decreased since the last password change, and nkeys+1 * is less than the previous nhist, it is possible for knext to * index into unallocated space. This condition would not be * caught by the resizing code above. */ if (knext + 1 > nkeys) knext = adb->old_key_next = 0; /* free the old pw history entry if it contains data */ histp = &adb->old_keys[knext]; for (i = 0; i < (unsigned int) histp->n_key_data; i++) krb5_free_key_data_contents(context, &histp->key_data[i]); free(histp->key_data); /* store the new entry */ adb->old_keys[knext] = *pw; /* update the next pointer */ if (++adb->old_key_next == nhist - 1) adb->old_key_next = 0; return(0); } /* FIXME: don't use global variable for this */ krb5_boolean use_password_server = 0; #ifdef USE_PASSWORD_SERVER static krb5_boolean kadm5_use_password_server (void) { return use_password_server; } #endif void kadm5_set_use_password_server (void); void kadm5_set_use_password_server (void) { use_password_server = 1; } #ifdef USE_PASSWORD_SERVER /* * kadm5_launch_task () runs a program (task_path) to synchronize the * Apple password server with the Kerberos database. Password server * programs can receive arguments on the command line (task_argv) * and a block of data via stdin (data_buffer). * * Because a failure to communicate with the tool results in the * password server falling out of sync with the database, * kadm5_launch_task() always fails if it can't talk to the tool. */ static kadm5_ret_t kadm5_launch_task (krb5_context context, const char *task_path, char * const task_argv[], const char *buffer) { kadm5_ret_t ret; int data_pipe[2]; ret = pipe (data_pipe); if (ret) ret = errno; if (!ret) { pid_t pid = fork (); if (pid == -1) { ret = errno; close (data_pipe[0]); close (data_pipe[1]); } else if (pid == 0) { /* The child: */ if (dup2 (data_pipe[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) _exit (1); close (data_pipe[0]); close (data_pipe[1]); execv (task_path, task_argv); _exit (1); /* Fail if execv fails */ } else { /* The parent: */ int status; ret = 0; close (data_pipe[0]); /* Write out the buffer to the child, add \n */ if (buffer) { if (krb5_net_write (context, data_pipe[1], buffer, strlen (buffer)) < 0 || krb5_net_write (context, data_pipe[1], "\n", 1) < 0) { /* kill the child to make sure waitpid() won't hang later */ ret = errno; kill (pid, SIGKILL); } } close (data_pipe[1]); waitpid (pid, &status, 0); if (!ret) { if (WIFEXITED (status)) { /* child read password and exited. Check the return value. */ if ((WEXITSTATUS (status) != 0) && (WEXITSTATUS (status) != 252)) { ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* password change rejected */ } } else { /* child read password but crashed or was killed */ ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; /* FIXME: better error */ } } } } return ret; } #endif kadm5_ret_t kadm5_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, char *password) { return kadm5_chpass_principal_3(server_handle, principal, FALSE, 0, NULL, password); } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_chpass_principal_3(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, krb5_boolean keepold, int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, char *password) { krb5_int32 now; kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; krb5_db_entry *kdb; int ret, ret2, last_pwd, hist_added; krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; osa_pw_hist_ent hist; krb5_keyblock *act_mkey, *hist_keyblocks = NULL; krb5_kvno act_kvno, hist_kvno; int new_n_ks_tuple = 0; krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); hist_added = 0; memset(&hist, 0, sizeof(hist)); if (principal == NULL || password == NULL) return EINVAL; if ((krb5_principal_compare(handle->context, principal, hist_princ)) == TRUE) return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb))) return(ret); ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple); if (ret) goto done; if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) { ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol); if (ret) goto done; } if (have_pol) { /* Create a password history entry before we change kdb's key_data. */ ret = kdb_get_hist_key(handle, &hist_keyblocks, &hist_kvno); if (ret) goto done; ret = create_history_entry(handle->context, &hist_keyblocks[0], kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data, &hist); if (ret) goto done; } if ((ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_pol ? &pol : NULL, principal))) goto done; ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey); if (ret) goto done; ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, password, 0 /* increment kvno */, keepold, kdb); if (ret) goto done; ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno); if (ret) goto done; kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE; ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now); if (ret) goto done; if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) { /* the policy was loaded before */ ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd); if (ret) goto done; #if 0 /* * The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has * modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this * check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A * local caller implicitly has all authorization bits. */ if ((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life && !(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) { ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON; goto done; } #endif ret = check_pw_reuse(handle->context, hist_keyblocks, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data, 1, &hist); if (ret) goto done; if (pol.pw_history_num > 1) { /* If hist_kvno has changed since the last password change, we * can't check the history. */ if (adb.admin_history_kvno == hist_kvno) { ret = check_pw_reuse(handle->context, hist_keyblocks, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data, adb.old_key_len, adb.old_keys); if (ret) goto done; } ret = add_to_history(handle->context, hist_kvno, &adb, &pol, &hist); if (ret) goto done; hist_added = 1; } if (pol.pw_max_life) kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life; else kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } else { kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } #ifdef USE_PASSWORD_SERVER if (kadm5_use_password_server () && (krb5_princ_size (handle->context, principal) == 1)) { krb5_data *princ = krb5_princ_component (handle->context, principal, 0); const char *path = "/usr/sbin/mkpassdb"; char *argv[] = { "mkpassdb", "-setpassword", NULL, NULL }; char *pstring = NULL; if (!ret) { pstring = malloc ((princ->length + 1) * sizeof (char)); if (pstring == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; } } if (!ret) { memcpy (pstring, princ->data, princ->length); pstring [princ->length] = '\0'; argv[2] = pstring; ret = kadm5_launch_task (handle->context, path, argv, password); } if (pstring != NULL) free (pstring); if (ret) goto done; } #endif ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now); if (ret) goto done; /* unlock principal on this KDC */ kdb->fail_auth_count = 0; /* key data and attributes changed, let the database provider know */ kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT; /* | KADM5_CPW_FUNCTION */ ret = k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal, keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password); if (ret) goto done; if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb))) goto done; (void) k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal, keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password); ret = KADM5_OK; done: free(new_ks_tuple); if (!hist_added && hist.key_data) free_history_entry(handle->context, &hist); kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); kdb_free_keyblocks(handle, hist_keyblocks); if (have_pol && (ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol)) && !ret) ret = ret2; return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, krb5_keyblock **keyblocks, int *n_keys) { return kadm5_randkey_principal_3(server_handle, principal, FALSE, 0, NULL, keyblocks, n_keys); } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_randkey_principal_3(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, krb5_boolean keepold, int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, krb5_keyblock **keyblocks, int *n_keys) { krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; krb5_int32 now; kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol; int ret, last_pwd, n_new_keys; krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; krb5_keyblock *act_mkey; krb5_kvno act_kvno; int new_n_ks_tuple = 0; krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL; if (keyblocks) *keyblocks = NULL; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); if (principal == NULL) return EINVAL; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb))) return(ret); ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple); if (ret) goto done; if (krb5_principal_compare(handle->context, principal, hist_princ)) { /* If changing the history entry, the new entry must have exactly one * key. */ if (keepold) return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL; new_n_ks_tuple = 1; } ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey); if (ret) goto done; ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, keepold, kdb); if (ret) goto done; ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno); if (ret) goto done; kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE; ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now); if (ret) goto done; if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) { ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol); if (ret) goto done; } if (have_pol) { ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd); if (ret) goto done; #if 0 /* * The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has * modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this * check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A * local caller implicitly has all authorization bits. */ if((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life && !(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) { ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON; goto done; } #endif if (pol.pw_max_life) kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life; else kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } else { kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now); if (ret) goto done; /* unlock principal on this KDC */ kdb->fail_auth_count = 0; if (keyblocks) { /* Return only the new keys added by krb5_dbe_crk. */ n_new_keys = count_new_keys(kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data); ret = decrypt_key_data(handle->context, n_new_keys, kdb->key_data, keyblocks, n_keys); if (ret) goto done; } /* key data changed, let the database provider know */ kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT; /* | KADM5_RANDKEY_USED */; ret = k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal, keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL); if (ret) goto done; if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb))) goto done; (void) k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles, KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal, keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, NULL); ret = KADM5_OK; done: free(new_ks_tuple); kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); if (have_pol) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol); return ret; } /* * kadm5_setv4key_principal: * * Set only ONE key of the principal, removing all others. This key * must have the DES_CBC_CRC enctype and is entered as having the * krb4 salttype. This is to enable things like kadmind4 to work. */ kadm5_ret_t kadm5_setv4key_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, krb5_keyblock *keyblock) { krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; krb5_int32 now; kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol; krb5_keysalt keysalt; int i, k, kvno, ret; krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE; #if 0 int last_pwd; #endif kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; krb5_key_data tmp_key_data; krb5_keyblock *act_mkey; memset( &tmp_key_data, 0, sizeof(tmp_key_data)); CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); if (principal == NULL || keyblock == NULL) return EINVAL; if (hist_princ && /* this will be NULL when initializing the databse */ ((krb5_principal_compare(handle->context, principal, hist_princ)) == TRUE)) return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL; if (keyblock->enctype != ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC) return KADM5_SETV4KEY_INVAL_ENCTYPE; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb))) return(ret); for (kvno = 0, i=0; in_key_data; i++) if (kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno > kvno) kvno = kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno; if (kdb->key_data != NULL) cleanup_key_data(handle->context, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data); kdb->key_data = (krb5_key_data*)krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, sizeof(krb5_key_data)); if (kdb->key_data == NULL) return ENOMEM; memset(kdb->key_data, 0, sizeof(krb5_key_data)); kdb->n_key_data = 1; keysalt.type = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4; /* XXX data.magic? */ keysalt.data.length = 0; keysalt.data.data = NULL; ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, NULL, &act_mkey); if (ret) goto done; /* use tmp_key_data as temporary location and reallocate later */ ret = krb5_dbe_encrypt_key_data(handle->context, act_mkey, keyblock, &keysalt, kvno + 1, &tmp_key_data); if (ret) { goto done; } for (k = 0; k < tmp_key_data.key_data_ver; k++) { kdb->key_data->key_data_type[k] = tmp_key_data.key_data_type[k]; kdb->key_data->key_data_length[k] = tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]; if (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k]) { kdb->key_data->key_data_contents[k] = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]); if (kdb->key_data->key_data_contents[k] == NULL) { cleanup_key_data(handle->context, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data); kdb->key_data = NULL; kdb->n_key_data = 0; ret = ENOMEM; goto done; } memcpy (kdb->key_data->key_data_contents[k], tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k], tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]); memset (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k], 0, tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]); free (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k]); tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k] = NULL; } } kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE; ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now); if (ret) goto done; if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) { ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol); if (ret) goto done; } if (have_pol) { #if 0 /* * The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has * modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this * check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A * local caller implicitly has all authorization bits. */ if (ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd)) goto done; if((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life && !(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) { ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON; goto done; } #endif if (pol.pw_max_life) kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life; else kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } else { kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now); if (ret) goto done; /* unlock principal on this KDC */ kdb->fail_auth_count = 0; if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb))) goto done; ret = KADM5_OK; done: for (i = 0; i < tmp_key_data.key_data_ver; i++) { if (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i]) { memset (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i], 0, tmp_key_data.key_data_length[i]); free (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i]); } } kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); if (have_pol) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol); return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_setkey_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, krb5_keyblock *keyblocks, int n_keys) { return kadm5_setkey_principal_3(server_handle, principal, FALSE, 0, NULL, keyblocks, n_keys); } /* Make key/salt list from keys for kadm5_setkey_principal_3() */ static kadm5_ret_t make_ks_from_keys(krb5_context context, int n_keys, krb5_keyblock *keyblocks, krb5_key_salt_tuple **ks_tuple) { int i; *ks_tuple = calloc(n_keys, sizeof(**ks_tuple)); if (*ks_tuple == NULL) return ENOMEM; for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { (*ks_tuple)[i].ks_enctype = keyblocks[i].enctype; (*ks_tuple)[i].ks_salttype = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL; } return 0; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_setkey_principal_3(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, krb5_boolean keepold, int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple, krb5_keyblock *keyblocks, int n_keys) { krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; krb5_int32 now; kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol; krb5_key_data *old_key_data; int n_old_keys; int i, j, k, kvno, ret; krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE; #if 0 int last_pwd; #endif kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; krb5_boolean similar; krb5_keysalt keysalt; krb5_key_data tmp_key_data; krb5_key_data *tptr; krb5_keyblock *act_mkey; krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_from_keys = NULL; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context); if (principal == NULL || keyblocks == NULL) return EINVAL; if (hist_princ && /* this will be NULL when initializing the databse */ ((krb5_principal_compare(handle->context, principal, hist_princ)) == TRUE)) return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb))) return(ret); if (!n_ks_tuple) { /* Apply policy to the key/salt types implied by the given keys */ ret = make_ks_from_keys(handle->context, n_keys, keyblocks, &ks_from_keys); if (ret) goto done; ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_keys, ks_from_keys, NULL, NULL); free(ks_from_keys); } else { /* * Apply policy to the given ks_tuples. Note that further below * we enforce keyblocks[i].enctype == ks_tuple[i].ks_enctype for * all i from 0 to n_keys, and that n_ks_tuple == n_keys if ks * tuples are given. */ ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, NULL, NULL); } if (ret) goto done; for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { for (j = i+1; j < n_keys; j++) { if ((ret = krb5_c_enctype_compare(handle->context, keyblocks[i].enctype, keyblocks[j].enctype, &similar))) return(ret); if (similar) { if (n_ks_tuple) { if (ks_tuple[i].ks_salttype == ks_tuple[j].ks_salttype) return KADM5_SETKEY_DUP_ENCTYPES; } else return KADM5_SETKEY_DUP_ENCTYPES; } } } if (n_ks_tuple && n_ks_tuple != n_keys) return KADM5_SETKEY3_ETYPE_MISMATCH; for (kvno = 0, i=0; in_key_data; i++) if (kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno > kvno) kvno = kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno; if (keepold) { old_key_data = kdb->key_data; n_old_keys = kdb->n_key_data; } else { if (kdb->key_data != NULL) cleanup_key_data(handle->context, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data); n_old_keys = 0; old_key_data = NULL; } /* Allocate one extra key_data to avoid allocating 0 bytes. */ kdb->key_data = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, (n_keys + n_old_keys + 1) * sizeof(krb5_key_data)); if (kdb->key_data == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto done; } memset(kdb->key_data, 0, (n_keys+n_old_keys)*sizeof(krb5_key_data)); kdb->n_key_data = 0; for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) { if (n_ks_tuple) { keysalt.type = ks_tuple[i].ks_salttype; keysalt.data.length = 0; keysalt.data.data = NULL; if (ks_tuple[i].ks_enctype != keyblocks[i].enctype) { ret = KADM5_SETKEY3_ETYPE_MISMATCH; goto done; } } memset (&tmp_key_data, 0, sizeof(tmp_key_data)); ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, NULL, &act_mkey); if (ret) goto done; ret = krb5_dbe_encrypt_key_data(handle->context, act_mkey, &keyblocks[i], n_ks_tuple ? &keysalt : NULL, kvno + 1, &tmp_key_data); if (ret) goto done; tptr = &kdb->key_data[i]; tptr->key_data_ver = tmp_key_data.key_data_ver; tptr->key_data_kvno = tmp_key_data.key_data_kvno; for (k = 0; k < tmp_key_data.key_data_ver; k++) { tptr->key_data_type[k] = tmp_key_data.key_data_type[k]; tptr->key_data_length[k] = tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]; if (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k]) { tptr->key_data_contents[k] = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]); if (tptr->key_data_contents[k] == NULL) { int i1; for (i1 = k; i1 < tmp_key_data.key_data_ver; i1++) { if (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i1]) { memset (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i1], 0, tmp_key_data.key_data_length[i1]); free (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i1]); } } ret = ENOMEM; goto done; } memcpy (tptr->key_data_contents[k], tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k], tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]); memset (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k], 0, tmp_key_data.key_data_length[k]); free (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k]); tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[k] = NULL; } } kdb->n_key_data++; } /* copy old key data if necessary */ for (i = 0; i < n_old_keys; i++) { kdb->key_data[i+n_keys] = old_key_data[i]; memset(&old_key_data[i], 0, sizeof (krb5_key_data)); kdb->n_key_data++; } if (old_key_data) krb5_db_free(handle->context, old_key_data); /* assert(kdb->n_key_data == n_keys + n_old_keys) */ kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE; if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now))) goto done; if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) { ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol); if (ret) goto done; } if (have_pol) { #if 0 /* * The spec says this check is overridden if the caller has * modify privilege. The admin server therefore makes this * check itself (in chpass_principal_wrapper, misc.c). A * local caller implicitly has all authorization bits. */ if (ret = krb5_dbe_lookup_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, &last_pwd)) goto done; if((now - last_pwd) < pol.pw_min_life && !(kdb->attributes & KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE)) { ret = KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON; goto done; } #endif if (pol.pw_max_life) kdb->pw_expiration = now + pol.pw_max_life; else kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } else { kdb->pw_expiration = 0; } if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now))) goto done; /* unlock principal on this KDC */ kdb->fail_auth_count = 0; if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb))) goto done; ret = KADM5_OK; done: kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); if (have_pol) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol); return ret; } /* * Return the list of keys like kadm5_randkey_principal, * but don't modify the principal. */ kadm5_ret_t kadm5_get_principal_keys(void *server_handle /* IN */, krb5_principal principal /* IN */, krb5_keyblock **keyblocks /* OUT */, int *n_keys /* OUT */) { krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; kadm5_ret_t ret; kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; if (keyblocks) *keyblocks = NULL; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); if (principal == NULL) return EINVAL; if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb))) return(ret); if (keyblocks) { ret = decrypt_key_data(handle->context, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data, keyblocks, n_keys); if (ret) goto done; } ret = KADM5_OK; done: kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return ret; } /* * Allocate an array of n_key_data krb5_keyblocks, fill in each * element with the results of decrypting the nth key in key_data, * and if n_keys is not NULL fill it in with the * number of keys decrypted. */ static int decrypt_key_data(krb5_context context, int n_key_data, krb5_key_data *key_data, krb5_keyblock **keyblocks, int *n_keys) { krb5_keyblock *keys; int ret, i; keys = (krb5_keyblock *) malloc(n_key_data*sizeof(krb5_keyblock)); if (keys == NULL) return ENOMEM; memset(keys, 0, n_key_data*sizeof(krb5_keyblock)); for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) { ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, &key_data[i], &keys[i], NULL); if (ret) { for (; i >= 0; i--) { if (keys[i].contents) { memset (keys[i].contents, 0, keys[i].length); free( keys[i].contents ); } } memset(keys, 0, n_key_data*sizeof(krb5_keyblock)); free(keys); return ret; } } *keyblocks = keys; if (n_keys) *n_keys = n_key_data; return 0; } /* * Function: kadm5_decrypt_key * * Purpose: Retrieves and decrypts a principal key. * * Arguments: * * server_handle (r) kadm5 handle * entry (r) principal retrieved with kadm5_get_principal * ktype (r) enctype to search for, or -1 to ignore * stype (r) salt type to search for, or -1 to ignore * kvno (r) kvno to search for, -1 for max, 0 for max * only if it also matches ktype and stype * keyblock (w) keyblock to fill in * keysalt (w) keysalt to fill in, or NULL * kvnop (w) kvno to fill in, or NULL * * Effects: Searches the key_data array of entry, which must have been * retrived with kadm5_get_principal with the KADM5_KEY_DATA mask, to * find a key with a specified enctype, salt type, and kvno in a * principal entry. If not found, return ENOENT. Otherwise, decrypt * it with the master key, and return the key in keyblock, the salt * in salttype, and the key version number in kvno. * * If ktype or stype is -1, it is ignored for the search. If kvno is * -1, ktype and stype are ignored and the key with the max kvno is * returned. If kvno is 0, only the key with the max kvno is returned * and only if it matches the ktype and stype; otherwise, ENOENT is * returned. */ kadm5_ret_t kadm5_decrypt_key(void *server_handle, kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, krb5_int32 ktype, krb5_int32 stype, krb5_int32 kvno, krb5_keyblock *keyblock, krb5_keysalt *keysalt, int *kvnop) { kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; krb5_db_entry dbent; krb5_key_data *key_data; krb5_keyblock *mkey_ptr; int ret; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); if (entry->n_key_data == 0 || entry->key_data == NULL) return EINVAL; /* find_enctype only uses these two fields */ dbent.n_key_data = entry->n_key_data; dbent.key_data = entry->key_data; if ((ret = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(handle->context, &dbent, ktype, stype, kvno, &key_data))) return ret; /* find_mkey only uses this field */ dbent.tl_data = entry->tl_data; if ((ret = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(handle->context, &dbent, &mkey_ptr))) { /* try refreshing master key list */ /* XXX it would nice if we had the mkvno here for optimization */ if (krb5_db_fetch_mkey_list(handle->context, master_princ, &master_keyblock) == 0) { if ((ret = krb5_dbe_find_mkey(handle->context, &dbent, &mkey_ptr))) { return ret; } } else { return ret; } } if ((ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(handle->context, NULL, key_data, keyblock, keysalt))) return ret; /* * Coerce the enctype of the output keyblock in case we got an * inexact match on the enctype; this behavior will go away when * the key storage architecture gets redesigned for 1.3. */ if (ktype != -1) keyblock->enctype = ktype; if (kvnop) *kvnop = key_data->key_data_kvno; return KADM5_OK; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_purgekeys(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, int keepkvno) { kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; kadm5_ret_t ret; krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; krb5_key_data *old_keydata; int n_old_keydata; int i, j, k; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); if (principal == NULL) return EINVAL; ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb); if (ret) return(ret); if (keepkvno <= 0) { keepkvno = krb5_db_get_key_data_kvno(handle->context, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data); } old_keydata = kdb->key_data; n_old_keydata = kdb->n_key_data; kdb->n_key_data = 0; /* Allocate one extra key_data to avoid allocating 0 bytes. */ kdb->key_data = krb5_db_alloc(handle->context, NULL, (n_old_keydata + 1) * sizeof(krb5_key_data)); if (kdb->key_data == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto done; } memset(kdb->key_data, 0, n_old_keydata * sizeof(krb5_key_data)); for (i = 0, j = 0; i < n_old_keydata; i++) { if (old_keydata[i].key_data_kvno < keepkvno) continue; /* Alias the key_data_contents pointers; we null them out in the * source array immediately after. */ kdb->key_data[j] = old_keydata[i]; for (k = 0; k < old_keydata[i].key_data_ver; k++) { old_keydata[i].key_data_contents[k] = NULL; } j++; } kdb->n_key_data = j; cleanup_key_data(handle->context, n_old_keydata, old_keydata); kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA; ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); if (ret) goto done; done: kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_get_strings(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, krb5_string_attr **strings_out, int *count_out) { kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; kadm5_ret_t ret; krb5_db_entry *kdb = NULL; *strings_out = NULL; *count_out = 0; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); if (principal == NULL) return EINVAL; ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, NULL); if (ret) return ret; ret = krb5_dbe_get_strings(handle->context, kdb, strings_out, count_out); kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, NULL); return ret; } kadm5_ret_t kadm5_set_string(void *server_handle, krb5_principal principal, const char *key, const char *value) { kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle; kadm5_ret_t ret; krb5_db_entry *kdb; osa_princ_ent_rec adb; CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle); if (principal == NULL || key == NULL) return EINVAL; ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb); if (ret) return ret; ret = krb5_dbe_set_string(handle->context, kdb, key, value); if (ret) goto done; kdb->mask = KADM5_TL_DATA; ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); done: kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb); return ret; }