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authorGreg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>2014-12-09 12:37:44 -0500
committerTom Yu <tlyu@mit.edu>2015-05-12 15:35:32 -0400
commit88a0d9cb69d9e9a4442e66e536ac7346e06b0021 (patch)
tree55558660c2fb5acfee18a4b48c207adff5bee358
parentd8a6524aad05a8a6d04998bf0698c0cab7ad54ab (diff)
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Fix krb5_read_message handling [CVE-2014-5355]
In recvauth_common, do not use strcmp against the data fields of krb5_data objects populated by krb5_read_message(), as there is no guarantee that they are C strings. Instead, create an expected krb5_data value and use data_eq(). In the sample user-to-user server application, check that the received client principal name is null-terminated before using it with printf and krb5_parse_name. CVE-2014-5355: In MIT krb5, when a server process uses the krb5_recvauth function, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference by sending a zero-byte version string, or a read beyond the end of allocated storage by sending a non-null-terminated version string. The example user-to-user server application (uuserver) is similarly vulnerable to a zero-length or non-null-terminated principal name string. The krb5_recvauth function reads two version strings from the client using krb5_read_message(), which produces a krb5_data structure containing a length and a pointer to an octet sequence. krb5_recvauth assumes that the data pointer is a valid C string and passes it to strcmp() to verify the versions. If the client sends an empty octet sequence, the data pointer will be NULL and strcmp() will dereference a NULL pointer, causing the process to crash. If the client sends a non-null-terminated octet sequence, strcmp() will read beyond the end of the allocated storage, possibly causing the process to crash. uuserver similarly uses krb5_read_message() to read a client principal name, and then passes it to printf() and krb5_parse_name() without verifying that it is a valid C string. The krb5_recvauth function is used by kpropd and the Kerberized versions of the BSD rlogin and rsh daemons. These daemons are usually run out of inetd or in a mode which forks before processing incoming connections, so a process crash will generally not result in a complete denial of service. Thanks to Tim Uglow for discovering this issue. CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C [tlyu@mit.edu: CVSS score] (cherry picked from commit 102bb6ebf20f9174130c85c3b052ae104e5073ec) (cherry picked from commit 21e4e653d8258d525f4b6ca87797d42a8bccc282) ticket: 8180 (new) version_fixed: 1.12.4 status: resolved
-rw-r--r--src/appl/user_user/server.c4
-rw-r--r--src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c9
2 files changed, 9 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/appl/user_user/server.c b/src/appl/user_user/server.c
index dbff68e..b136c72 100644
--- a/src/appl/user_user/server.c
+++ b/src/appl/user_user/server.c
@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ int main(argc, argv)
}
#endif
+ /* principal name must be sent null-terminated. */
retval = krb5_read_message(context, (krb5_pointer) &sock, &pname_data);
- if (retval) {
+ if (retval || pname_data.length == 0 ||
+ pname_data.data[pname_data.length - 1] != '\0') {
com_err ("uu-server", retval, "reading pname");
return 2;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
index da836283..5adc6dd 100644
--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
krb5_rcache rcache = 0;
krb5_octet response;
krb5_data null_server;
+ krb5_data d;
int need_error_free = 0;
int local_rcache = 0, local_authcon = 0;
@@ -77,7 +78,8 @@ recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
- if (strcmp(inbuf.data, sendauth_version)) {
+ d = make_data((char *)sendauth_version, strlen(sendauth_version) + 1);
+ if (!data_eq(inbuf, d)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
response = 1;
}
@@ -93,8 +95,9 @@ recvauth_common(krb5_context context,
*/
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
- if (appl_version && strcmp(inbuf.data, appl_version)) {
- if (!problem) {
+ if (appl_version != NULL && !problem) {
+ d = make_data(appl_version, strlen(appl_version) + 1);
+ if (!data_eq(inbuf, d)) {
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS;
response = 2;
}