From fbc45d7228de54e227d61dcc60ee49ef0dfea4e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Benjamin Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 01:21:24 -0400 Subject: No-op ticket encryption in fuzzer mode. This allows the fuzzer to discover server-side resumption paths by simply supplying what we'd like the ticket to decrypt to in the clear. We also have a natural way to get transcripts out of runner. We record the runner-side transcripts, so all resumption handshakes will replay the shim-created unencrypted tickets. BUG=104 Change-Id: Icf9cbf4af520077d38e2c8c2766b6f8bfa3c9ab5 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11224 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin Commit-Queue: Adam Langley Reviewed-by: Adam Langley CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org --- FUZZING.md | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'FUZZING.md') diff --git a/FUZZING.md b/FUZZING.md index 954a4f7..c541a2d 100644 --- a/FUZZING.md +++ b/FUZZING.md @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ When `-DFUZZ=1` is passed into CMake, BoringSSL builds with `BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FU * Use a hard-coded time instead of the actual time. +* Tickets are unencrypted and the MAC check is performed but ignored. + This is to prevent the fuzzer from getting stuck at a cryptographic invariant in the protocol. ## TLS transcripts -- cgit v1.1