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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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It is possible that DTLS records are received out of order such that
records from the next epoch arrive before we have finished processing the
current epoch. We are supposed to buffer such records but for some reason
we only did that for handshake and alert records. This is incorrect since
it is perfectly possible for app data records to arrive early too.
Fixes #20597
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20637)
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Early data decryption is expected to fail sometimes. If it does we should
not leave spurious error entries on the queue.
Fixes #20377
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20442)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20508)
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We shouldn't be putting more data into a pipeline than the value of
split_send_fragment.
This is a backport of a fix which was included in a much larger commit in
master (c6186792b98) related to moving the pipelining code into the new
record layer that exists there.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20208)
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During read pipelining we must ensure that the buffer is sufficiently large
to read enough data to fill our pipelines. We also remove some code that
moved data to the start of the packet if we can. This was unnecessary
because of later code which would end up moving it anyway. The earlier move
was also incorrect in the case that |clearold| was 0. This would cause the
read pipelining code to fail with sufficiently large records.
Fixes #20197
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20208)
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The pipeline input/output buf arrays must remain accessible to the
EVP_CIPHER_CTX until EVP_Cipher is subsequently called. This fixes an
asan error discovered by the newly added pipeline test.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20208)
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Some ciphers/protocol versions have an explicit IV. We need to make sure we
have sufficient room for it in the underlying buffer.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20086)
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Backport of commit 624efd2
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19967)
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We had two different macros for calculating the potential growth due to
encryption. The macro we use for allocating the underlying buffer should be
the same one that we use for reserving bytes for encryption growth.
Also if we are adding the MAC independently of the cipher algorithm then
the encryption growth will not include that MAC so we should remove it
from the amount of bytes that we reserve for that growth. Otherwise we
might exceed our buffer size and the WPACKET_reserve operation will
fail.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19264)
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Stitched ciphersuites can grow by more during encryption than the code
allowed for. We fix the calculation and add an assert to check we go it
right.
Note that this is not a security issue. Even though we can overflow the
amount of bytes reserved in the WPACKET for the encryption, the underlying
buffer is still big enough.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19517)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/19382)
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If app data is received before a Finished message in DTLS then we buffer
it to return later. The function SSL_pending() is supposed to tell you
how much processed app data we have already buffered, and SSL_has_pending()
is supposed to tell you if we have any data buffered (whether processed or
not, and whether app data or not).
Neither SSL_pending() or SSL_has_pending() were taking account of this
DTLS specific app data buffer.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18975)
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As EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length indicates failure with -1, this error
should be processed. Also the result of this function shouldn't be
assigned to an unsigned variable.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18922)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Release: yes
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18369)
(cherry picked from commit 639e576023aa2492ca87e1e6503c40d2e8c9a24e)
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rotated_mac is a 64-byte aligned buffer of size 64 and rotate_offset is secret.
Consider a weaker leakage model(CL) where only cacheline base address is leaked,
i.e address/32 for 32-byte cacheline(CL32).
Previous code used to perform two loads
1. rotated_mac[rotate_offset ^ 32] and
2. rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]
which would leak 2q + 1, 2q for 0 <= rotate_offset < 32
and 2q, 2q + 1 for 32 <= rotate_offset < 64
The proposed fix performs load operations which will always leak 2q, 2q + 1 and
selects the appropriate value in constant-time.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/18033)
(cherry picked from commit 3b836385679504579ee1052ed4b4ef1d9f49fa13)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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In some corner cases the check for packets
which exceed the allowed record length was missing
when KTLS is initially enabled, when some
unprocessed packets are still pending.
Add at least some tests for KTLS, since we have
currently not very much test coverage for KTLS.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17504)
(cherry picked from commit 8fff986d52606e1a33f9404504535e2e2aee3e8b)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17415)
(cherry picked from commit 949e4f79d202d43519d373b2af6b1a4948bf1a74)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17032)
(cherry picked from commit c9007bda79291179ed2df31b3dfd9f1311102847)
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This replaces the AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1 cipher with a
non-encrypting version for use the test suite.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16693)
(cherry picked from commit 64da15c40d15aac58e211fd25d00e9ae84d0379b)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16680)
(cherry picked from commit 105af0ad923a665ca5fee296b52dbf34b524a2aa)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16385)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16176)
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Various comments referred to s->packet and s->packet_length instead of
s->rlayer.packet and s->rlayer.packet_length. Also fixed is a spot where
RECORD_LAYER_write_pending() should have been used. Based on the review
comments in #16077.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16086)
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Sometimes this function gets called when the buffers have already been
set up. If there is already a partial packet in the read buffer then the
packet pointer will be set to an incorrect value. The packet pointer already
gets reset to the correct value when we first read a packet anyway, so we
don't also need to do it in ssl3_setup_read_buffer.
Fixes #13729
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16077)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15824)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15801)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15539)
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For functions that exist in 1.1.1 provide a simple aliases via #define.
Fixes #15236
Functions with OSSL_DECODER_, OSSL_ENCODER_, OSSL_STORE_LOADER_,
EVP_KEYEXCH_, EVP_KEM_, EVP_ASYM_CIPHER_, EVP_SIGNATURE_,
EVP_KEYMGMT_, EVP_RAND_, EVP_MAC_, EVP_KDF_, EVP_PKEY_,
EVP_MD_, and EVP_CIPHER_ prefixes are renamed.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15405)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15513)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14986)
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Add a "where did this EVP_{CIPHER,MD} come from" flag: global, via fetch,
or via EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_meth_new. Update EVP_{CIPHER,MD}_free to handle all
three origins. The flag is deliberately right before some function pointers,
so that compile-time failures (int/pointer) will occur, as opposed to
taking a bit in the existing "flags" field. The "global variable" flag
is non-zero, so the default case of using OPENSSL_zalloc (for provider
ciphers), will do the right thing. Ref-counting is a no-op for
Make up_ref no-op for global MD and CIPHER objects
Deprecate EVP_MD_CTX_md(). Added EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md() (same semantics as
the deprecated function) and EVP_MD_CTX_get1_md(). Likewise, deprecate
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() in favor of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(), and add
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get1_CIPHER().
Refactor EVP_MD_free() and EVP_MD_meth_free() to call new common
evp_md_free_int() function.
Refactor EVP_CIPHER_free() and EVP_CIPHER_meth_free() to call new common
evp_cipher_free_int() function.
Also change some flags tests to explicit test == or != zero. E.g.,
if (flags & x) --> if ((flags & x) != 0)
if (!(flags & x)) --> if ((flags & x) == 0)
Only done for those lines where "get0_cipher" calls were made.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14193)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14235)
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Using ERR_LIB_* causes the error output to say 'reason(n)' instead of
the name of the sub-library in question.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14152)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13999)
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Our free functions should be able to deal with the case where the object
being freed is NULL. This turns out to not be quite the case for DTLS
related objects.
Fixes #13649
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13655)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13577)
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This code started off as a copy of ssl3_write_bytes(), and the comment
was not updated with the implementation.
Reported by yangyangtiantianlonglong in #13518
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13566)
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These two bodies should be grouped together anyway as the reason for
the call to BIO_flush() is to permit using BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13090)
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When using KTLS, empty fragments sent as a mitigation for known-IV
weakenesses in TLS 1.0 are sent as writes of 0 bytes. The TLS header
and trailer are added to the empty fragment by the kernel.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13090)
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Since SSLfatal() doesn't take a function code any more, we drop that
argument everywhere. Also, we convert all combinations of SSLfatal()
and ERR_add_data() to an SSLfatal_data() call.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13316)
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This was done using util/err-to-raise
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13316)
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DTLS by design ignores records/packets with bad MAC or failed AEAD tag
validation. However, recent changes to have provided cipher
implementations caused tls1_enc() to leave an entry on the error queue
for invalid GCM tags, e.g.:
800BEAEF487F0000:error::Provider routines:gcm_stream_update:cipher operation failed:providers/implementations/ciphers/ciphercommon_gcm.c:306
The BoringSSL tests check for entries on the error queue with
SSL_get_error() and so we were seeing spurious test failures
due to the additional item on the error queue. To avoid leaving
such spurious entries on the error queue, set a mark before calling
the ssl3_enc 'enc' method, and pop to that mark before ignoring
invalid packets.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13251)
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Many of the new types introduced by OpenSSL 3.0 have an OSSL_ prefix,
e.g., OSSL_CALLBACK, OSSL_PARAM, OSSL_ALGORITHM, OSSL_SERIALIZER.
The OPENSSL_CTX type stands out a little by using a different prefix.
For consistency reasons, this type is renamed to OSSL_LIB_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12621)
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Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11961)
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Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11961)
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Previously we passed it the data plus mac size. Now we just pass it the
data size. We already know the mac size.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
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This commit just moves the TLS1 and above implementation to use the TLS
HMAC implementation in the providers.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12732)
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