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2019-03-19Single step kdf implementationShane Lontis1-0/+6
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8230)
2019-03-14Configure: disable new trace api by defaultDr. Matthias St. Pierre1-3/+8
Fixes #8472 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8474)
2019-03-06Add a log about the tracing functionalityRichard Levitte1-0/+9
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8198)
2019-03-05Configure: make C++ build tests optional and configurableRichard Levitte1-0/+8
Disabled by default Fixes #8360 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8370)
2019-02-18Properties for implementation selection.Pauli1-0/+4
Properties are a sequence of comma separated name=value pairs. A name without a corresponding value is assumed to be a Boolean and have the true value 'yes'. Values are either strings or numbers. Strings can be quoted either _"_ or _'_ or unquoted (with restrictions). There are no escape characters inside strings. Number are either decimal digits or '0x' followed by hexidecimal digits. Numbers are represented internally as signed sixty four bit values. Queries on properties are a sequence comma separated conditional tests. These take the form of name=value (equality test), name!=value (inequality test) or name (Boolean test for truth). Queries can be parsed, compared against a definition or merged pairwise. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8224)
2019-02-17SCA hardening for mod. field inversion in EC_GROUPBilly Brumley1-0/+6
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures. The new pointer is defined as: `int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)` and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field, storing the result in `r`. Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA countermeasures: - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through blinding. - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT) inversion. - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which already features SCA hardening through blinding. From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e., `EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack states. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8254)
2019-02-14Don't signal SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START for TLSv1.3 post-handshake messagesMatt Caswell1-0/+13
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly. This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in the normal way. This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it, KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications. Fixes #8069 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096)
2019-02-13Added new EVP/KDF API.David Makepeace1-0/+7
Changed PKEY/KDF API to call the new API. Added wrappers for PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() and EVP_PBE_scrypt() to call the new EVP KDF APIs. Documentation updated. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6674)
2019-02-12CHANGES: add note about building devcrypto dynamicEneas U de Queiroz1-0/+3
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7859)
2019-02-07Add CHANGES entry for blake2macAntoine Salon1-0/+3
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8172)
2019-02-05Remove unnecessary trailing whitespaceSam Roberts1-1/+1
Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards, AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling. Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092)
2019-02-01Add an entry to the CHANGES for the d2i_X509_PUBKEY fixBernd Edlinger1-0/+4
The commit 5dc40a83c74be579575a512b30d9c1e0364e6a7b forgot to add a short description to the CHANGES file. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8144)
2019-02-01Fix end-point shared secret for DTLS/SCTPMichael Tuexen1-0/+7
When computing the end-point shared secret, don't take the terminating NULL character into account. Please note that this fix breaks interoperability with older versions of OpenSSL, which are not fixed. Fixes #7956 Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7957)
2018-12-12Add RFC5297 AES-SIV supportTodd Short1-0/+3
Based originally on github.com/dfoxfranke/libaes_siv This creates an SIV128 mode that uses EVP interfaces for the CBC, CTR and CMAC code to reduce complexity at the cost of perfomance. The expected use is for short inputs, not TLS-sized records. Add multiple AAD input capacity in the EVP tests. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3540)
2018-12-11typo ANS1 -> ASN1nxtstep1-1/+1
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7857)
2018-12-07CHANGES: Add Linux Kernel TLS data-pathBoris Pismenny1-0/+5
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
2018-12-07Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0() stricter about its inputRichard Levitte1-0/+3
It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the method is getting registered. Fixes #7758 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7847)
2018-12-06Change license to the Apache License v2.0Richard Levitte1-0/+3
This applies to the 'master' git branch and OpenSSL version 3.0.0 and up. Pre-3.0.0 versions retain the previous license. The boilerplate will change in increments after this change. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7764)
2018-12-06Refactor the computation of API version limitsRichard Levitte1-0/+9
Previously, the API version limit was indicated with a numeric version number. This was "natural" in the pre-3.0.0 because the version was this simple number. With 3.0.0, the version is divided into three separate numbers, and it's only the major number that counts, but we still need to be able to support pre-3.0.0 version limits. Therefore, we allow OPENSSL_API_COMPAT to be defined with a pre-3.0.0 style numeric version number or with a simple major number, i.e. can be defined like this for any application: -D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L -D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=3 Since the pre-3.0.0 numerical version numbers are high, it's easy to distinguish between a simple major number and a pre-3.0.0 numerical version number and to thereby support both forms at the same time. Internally, we define the following macros depending on the value of OPENSSL_API_COMPAT: OPENSSL_API_0_9_8 OPENSSL_API_1_0_0 OPENSSL_API_1_1_0 OPENSSL_API_3 They indicate that functions marked for deprecation in the corresponding major release shall not be built if defined. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
2018-12-06Switch to MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH versioning and version 3.0.0-devRichard Levitte1-1/+13
We're strictly use version numbers of the form MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH. Letter releases are things of days past. The most central change is that we now express the version number with three macros, one for each part of the version number: OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR OPENSSL_VERSION_MINOR OPENSSL_VERSION_PATCH We also provide two additional macros to express pre-release and build metadata information (also specified in semantic versioning): OPENSSL_VERSION_PRE_RELEASE OPENSSL_VERSION_BUILD_METADATA To get the library's idea of all those values, we introduce the following functions: unsigned int OPENSSL_version_major(void); unsigned int OPENSSL_version_minor(void); unsigned int OPENSSL_version_patch(void); const char *OPENSSL_version_pre_release(void); const char *OPENSSL_version_build_metadata(void); Additionally, for shared library versioning (which is out of scope in semantic versioning, but that we still need): OPENSSL_SHLIB_VERSION We also provide a macro that contains the release date. This is not part of the version number, but is extra information that we want to be able to display: OPENSSL_RELEASE_DATE Finally, also provide the following convenience functions: const char *OPENSSL_version_text(void); const char *OPENSSL_version_text_full(void); The following macros and functions are deprecated, and while currently existing for backward compatibility, they are expected to disappear: OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT OPENSSL_VERSION OpenSSL_version_num() OpenSSL_version() Also, this function is introduced to replace OpenSSL_version() for all indexes except for OPENSSL_VERSION: OPENSSL_info() For configuration, the option 'newversion-only' is added to disable all the macros and functions that are mentioned as deprecated above. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
2018-11-24Document the removed 'dist' targetRichard Levitte1-0/+5
Also adds missing copyright boilerplate to util/mktar.sh Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7696)
2018-11-20Update CHANGES and NEWS for new releaseMatt Caswell1-1/+21
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7663)
2018-11-10Recreate the OS390-Unix config targetRichard Levitte1-0/+4
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5035)
2018-11-05Build: make it possibly to specify subdirs in build.infoRichard Levitte1-0/+5
This adds a keyword SUBDIRS for build.info, to be used like this: SUBDIRS=foo bar This tells Configure that it should look for 'build.info' in the relative subdirectories 'foo' and 'bar' as well. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7558)
2018-11-05GMAC implementationPauli1-0/+3
Remove GMAC demo program because it has been superceded by the EVP MAC one Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7548)
2018-10-30Add blurbs about EVP_MAC in NEWS and CHANGESRichard Levitte1-0/+9
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7526)
2018-10-17Deprecate ECDH_KDF_X9_62()Antoine Salon1-0/+4
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345)
2018-10-17EVP module documentation passAntoine Salon1-0/+5
Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63() Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345)
2018-10-16DRBG: fix reseeding via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() with large inputDr. Matthias St. Pierre1-1/+11
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer was limited to the size of 4096 bytes. When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG, the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code. As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively ignored. This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion. Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state, which forces a reinstantiation on next call. Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Fixes #7381 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
2018-10-01'openssl list': add option -objects to list built in objectsRichard Levitte1-0/+4
Related to #6696 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6702)
2018-09-12Configure: Name object files according to the product they are part ofRichard Levitte1-0/+5
This will allow to have different object files for different products, even if they share the same source code, and possibly different builds for those different object files. For example, one can have something like this: SOURCES[libfoo]=cookie.c INCLUDES[libfoo]=include/foo SOURCES[libbar]=cookie.c INCLUDES[libbar]=include/bar This would mean that the object files and libraries would be build somewhat like this: $(CC) -Iinclude/foo -o libfoo-lib-cookie.o cookie.c $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) libfoo.a libfoo-lib-cookie.o $(CC) -Iinclude/bar -o libbar-lib-cookie.o cookie.c $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) libbar.a libbar-lib-cookie.o Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7159)
2018-09-12Add a note to CHANGES indicating that AES-XTS now enforces two differentPauli1-8/+6
keys. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7120)
2018-09-12FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS key check.Pauli1-0/+7
Add a check that the two keys used for AES-XTS are different. One test case uses the same key for both of the AES-XTS keys. This causes a failure under FIP 140-2 IG A.9. Mark the test as returning a failure. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7120)
2018-09-11The next version in master is at least 1.1.2, not 1.1.1xRichard Levitte1-1/+1
The OMC hasn't yet decided what the next release version will be, but it's at least going to 1.1.2, so we set that value for the moment. Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7180)
2018-09-11Prepare for 1.1.1a-devMatt Caswell1-0/+4
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2018-09-11Prepare for 1.1.1 releaseOpenSSL_1_1_1Matt Caswell1-1/+1
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2018-09-10More updates to CHANGES and NEWS for the 1.1.1 releaseMatt Caswell1-0/+8
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7167)
2018-09-10Add a sentence in CHANGES to note SM2 supportPaul Yang1-0/+3
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7160)
2018-08-21Fix a version error in CHANGES and NEWSMatt Caswell1-1/+1
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7019)
2018-08-15Update code for the final RFC version of TLSv1.3 (RFC8446)Matt Caswell1-10/+1
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6741)
2018-08-14Updates to CHANGES and NEWS for the new release.Matt Caswell1-0/+56
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6949)
2018-08-07CHANGES: mention s390x assembly pack extensionsPatrick Steuer1-0/+5
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6870)
2018-08-07Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() stricter with its inputRichard Levitte1-0/+5
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6880)
2018-07-26EC GFp ladderBilly Brumley1-1/+10
This commit leverages the Montgomery ladder scaffold introduced in #6690 (alongside a specialized Lopez-Dahab ladder for binary curves) to provide a specialized differential addition-and-double implementation to speedup prime curves, while keeping all the features of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` against SCA attacks. The arithmetic in ladder_pre, ladder_step and ladder_post is auto generated with tooling, from the following formulae: - `ladder_pre`: Formula 3 for doubling from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2 - `ladder_step`: differential addition-and-doubling Eq. (8) and (10) from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks", as described at https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3 - `ladder_post`: y-coordinate recovery using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye "Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to work in projective coordinates. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6772)
2018-07-26Make number of Miller-Rabin tests for a prime tests depend on the security ↵Kurt Roeckx1-0/+7
level of the prime The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #6075 Fixes: #6012
2018-07-26Change the number of Miller-Rabin test for DSA generation to 64Kurt Roeckx1-0/+3
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit. We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #6075
2018-07-23Make sure the 'tsget' script is called 'tsget.pl' everywhereRichard Levitte1-0/+6
The result is that we don't have to produce different names on different platforms, and we won't have confusion on Windows depending on if the script was built with mingw or with MSVC. Partial fix for #3254 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6764)
2018-07-18CHANGES: mention blinding reverting in ECDSA. [skip ci]Andy Polyakov1-0/+4
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6664)
2018-07-16EC2M Lopez-Dahab ladder implementationNicola Tuveri1-0/+6
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the operands. The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is auto generated with tooling: - see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the `ladder_pre` implementation; - see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3 for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in `ladder_step`; - see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m) without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in affine coordinates. Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
2018-07-16EC point multiplication: add `ladder` scaffoldNicola Tuveri1-0/+7
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret scalar is feed to the point multiplication). The newly introduced default implementation directly used EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop. The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling and different coordinate systems. - `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R. Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling; - `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could, e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential addition-and-doubling; - `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of the result point. This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`, as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily constant-time themselves. What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar. Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
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