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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2d2671790ee12dedd92c97f35b6feb755b8d4374)
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This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1ffc6ca1c387efad0772c16dfe426afef45dc4f)
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Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86d21d0b9577322ac5da0114c5fac16eb49b4cef)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41c9cfbc4ee7345547fb98cccb8511f082f0910b)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
.gitignore
(cherry picked from commit 04f670cf3d8f22e0d197a071d2db536fb7ebd9c7)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5c5e7e1a7eb114cf136e1ae4b6a413bc48ba41eb)
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 652ff0f4796eecd8729b4690f2076d1c7ccb2862)
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Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_pkt.c
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a4d4158572fd8b3dc641851b8378e791df7972d)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4138e3882556c762d77eb827b8be98507cde48df)
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb62ab4b17818fe66d2fed0a7fe71969131c811b)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b691154e18c0367643696db3cf73debe9ddfa9ae)
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OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc88aec8c9e001b0a0077d3cd4de1ed0e6)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
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Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b15f8769644b00ef7283521593360b7b2135cb63)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4c52816d35681c0533c25fdd3abb4b7c6962302d)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/x_algor.c
crypto/x509/x509.h
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According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5b566320a8d774f9475540f7d0e6a704d)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
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is run with --strict-warnings.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 488f16e31b8f5ec2513410929325d0830d76762d)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.
This reverts commit b55ff319f880adc874b8c95957adf2003117d42b.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d9f366c849c9627ab666d1b1addc024e6)
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7f9edfd23a9b9cd0827cc381e8fbd8cd0c9e5035)
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55e530265a7ea8f264717a4e37338cc04eca2007)
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Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1904d21123849a65dafde1705e6dd5b7c2f420eb)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9beb948c0dae6056caddf46a9aa099e18905d184)
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Based on commit 66f96fe2d519147097c118d4bf60704c69ed0635 by Steve Henson
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ce5ddefc4394a0ae6c79efaffe08cf47ac659ea0)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d04a1e0b5beb3329cdf8c4ec35b9113cbc41d2f2)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb1ddd3d9a0d01656b90693a214b911995a5fe8c)
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malloc failure.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c6a84ff3516d8ecd92d866b6f0ae0d63df6d9c53)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41bf25013032da0eeb111ce3c8fc0946c0e61c41)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 76e6509085ea96df0ca542568ee2596343711307)
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_lib.c
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Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4bb8eb9ce4f794fecf020a15b54e8505fced0edf)
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than the mtu we are already using
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 047f21593eebbc617a410a208ded01e65ca11028)
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and UDP header) when setting an mtu. This constant is not always correct (e.g.
if using IPv6). Use the new DTLS_CTRL functions instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 464ce92026bd0c79186cbefa75470f39607110be)
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we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit
fixes that.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d3d9eef31661633f5b003a9e115c1822f79d1870)
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at least the minimum or it will fail.
There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up
being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This
shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having
logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum
mtu to use.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1620a2e49c777f31f2ce57966ae74006b48ad759)
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