diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
98 files changed, 471 insertions, 313 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c index ba90952..de44a58 100644 --- a/crypto/aes/aes_core.c +++ b/crypto/aes/aes_core.c @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ #include "aes_locl.h" #ifndef AES_ASM -/* +/*- Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; diff --git a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c index e438580..41d3251 100644 --- a/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c +++ b/crypto/aes/aes_x86core.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64; }) # endif #endif -/* +/*- Te [x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03, 02, 01, 01, 03]; Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; #define Te1 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+3)) #define Te2 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+2)) #define Te3 (u32)((u64*)((u8*)Te+1)) -/* +/*- Td [x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b, 0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c index 7b4a193..2f7c790 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c @@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it, signature); if (rv == 1) outl = signature->length; - /* Return value meanings: + /*- + * Return value meanings: * <=0: error. * 1: method does everything. * 2: carry on as normal. diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_time.c b/crypto/asn1/a_time.c index 7036868..311e066 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_time.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_time.c @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ */ -/* This is an implementation of the ASN1 Time structure which is: +/*- + * This is an implementation of the ASN1 Time structure which is: * Time ::= CHOICE { * utcTime UTCTime, * generalTime GeneralizedTime } diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c b/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c index 508e11e..2105306 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_utf8.c @@ -63,7 +63,8 @@ /* UTF8 utilities */ -/* This parses a UTF8 string one character at a time. It is passed a pointer +/*- + * This parses a UTF8 string one character at a time. It is passed a pointer * to the string and the length of the string. It sets 'value' to the value of * the current character. It returns the number of characters read or a * negative error code: diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h index 68be533..fc87e0c 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h @@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ typedef struct ASN1_VALUE_st ASN1_VALUE; TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(void); -/* The following macros and typedefs allow an ASN1_ITEM +/*- + * The following macros and typedefs allow an ASN1_ITEM * to be embedded in a structure and referenced. Since * the ASN1_ITEM pointers need to be globally accessible * (possibly from shared libraries) they may exist in diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1t.h b/crypto/asn1/asn1t.h index d230e4b..47502a6 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn1t.h +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1t.h @@ -129,7 +129,8 @@ extern "C" { /* This is a ASN1 type which just embeds a template */ -/* This pair helps declare a SEQUENCE. We can do: +/*- + * This pair helps declare a SEQUENCE. We can do: * * ASN1_SEQUENCE(stname) = { * ... SEQUENCE components ... @@ -231,7 +232,8 @@ extern "C" { ASN1_ITEM_end(tname) -/* This pair helps declare a CHOICE type. We can do: +/*- + * This pair helps declare a CHOICE type. We can do: * * ASN1_CHOICE(chname) = { * ... CHOICE options ... diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_attrib.c b/crypto/asn1/x_attrib.c index 1e3713f..04ae991 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/x_attrib.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/x_attrib.c @@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ #include <openssl/asn1t.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> -/* X509_ATTRIBUTE: this has the following form: +/*- + * X509_ATTRIBUTE: this has the following form: * * typedef struct x509_attributes_st * { diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_req.c b/crypto/asn1/x_req.c index d575558..529899a 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/x_req.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/x_req.c @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ #include <openssl/asn1t.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> -/* X509_REQ_INFO is handled in an unusual way to get round +/*- + * X509_REQ_INFO is handled in an unusual way to get round * invalid encodings. Some broken certificate requests don't * encode the attributes field if it is empty. This is in * violation of PKCS#10 but we need to tolerate it. We do diff --git a/crypto/bf/blowfish.h b/crypto/bf/blowfish.h index b97e76f..50787ed 100644 --- a/crypto/bf/blowfish.h +++ b/crypto/bf/blowfish.h @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ extern "C" { #define BF_ENCRYPT 1 #define BF_DECRYPT 0 -/* +/*- * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * ! BF_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide. If it's wider, then ! * ! BF_LONG_LOG2 has to be defined along. ! diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/crypto/bio/b_print.c index 143a7cf..bde51d8 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/b_print.c +++ b/crypto/bio/b_print.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ * on all source code distributions. */ -/* +/*- * This code contains numerious changes and enhancements which were * made by lots of contributors over the last years to Patrick Powell's * original code: diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio.h b/crypto/bio/bio.h index 122ec04..3ea44ab 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bio.h +++ b/crypto/bio/bio.h @@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ extern "C" { #define BIO_GHBN_CTRL_FLUSH 5 /* Mostly used in the SSL BIO */ -/* Not used anymore +/*- + * Not used anymore * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_DELAYED_READ 0x10 * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_DELAYED_WRITE 0x20 * #define BIO_FLAGS_PROTOCOL_STARTUP 0x40 @@ -336,7 +337,8 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO) typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct { - /* Buffers are setup like this: + /*- + * Buffers are setup like this: * * <---------------------- size -----------------------> * +---------------------------------------------------+ @@ -715,7 +717,8 @@ int BIO_hex_string(BIO *out, int indent, int width, unsigned char *data, int datalen); struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name); -/* We might want a thread-safe interface too: +/*- + * We might want a thread-safe interface too: * struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname_r(const char *name, * struct hostent *result, void *buffer, size_t buflen); * or something similar (caller allocates a struct hostent, diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c index 4110ff1..0237c0f 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) ret=(long)data->bind_mode; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: -/* dbio=(BIO *)ptr; +/*- dbio=(BIO *)ptr; if (data->param_port) EAY EAY BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port); if (data->param_hostname) diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c b/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c index 52ef0eb..6d86587 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_bio.c @@ -269,7 +269,8 @@ static int bio_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int size_) return size; } -/* non-copying interface: provide pointer to available data in buffer +/*- + * non-copying interface: provide pointer to available data in buffer * bio_nread0: return number of available bytes * bio_nread: also advance index * (example usage: bio_nread0(), read from buffer, bio_nread() @@ -422,7 +423,8 @@ static int bio_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int num_) return num; } -/* non-copying interface: provide pointer to region to write to +/*- + * non-copying interface: provide pointer to region to write to * bio_nwrite0: check how much space is available * bio_nwrite: also increase length * (example usage: bio_nwrite0(), write to buffer, bio_nwrite() diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c index 7d97c0b..c6d12f4 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ #if !(defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2) # include "../bn_asm.c" /* kind of dirty hack for Sun Studio */ #else -/* +/*- * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002. * * Implemented by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ #undef mul #undef mul_add -/* +/*- * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code; * "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it * want to keep the value of zero; diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_add.c b/crypto/bn/bn_add.c index 659e1d2..2584234 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_add.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_add.c @@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); - /* a + b a+b + /*- + * a + b a+b * a + -b a-b * -a + b b-a * -a + -b -(a+b) @@ -266,7 +267,8 @@ int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b) bn_check_top(a); bn_check_top(b); - /* a - b a-b + /*- + * a - b a-b * a - -b a+b * -a - b -(a+b) * -a - -b b-a diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c index 1b5c29c..da6b4cf 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_div.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_div.c @@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ -/* BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards +/*- + * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards * zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. * Thus: * dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero) diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c index 3a1941a..45760a8 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c @@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, bn_check_top(p); bn_check_top(m); - /* For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute + /*- + * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute * a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT. diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c index 63a77d2..233e3f5 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c @@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, if (!BN_nnmod(B, B, A, ctx)) goto err; } sign = -1; - /* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that + /*- + * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that * * 0 <= B < A, * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), @@ -280,7 +281,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, while (!BN_is_zero(B)) { - /* + /*- * 0 < B < |n|, * 0 < A <= |n|, * (1) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), @@ -327,7 +328,8 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, } - /* We still have (1) and (2). + /*- + * We still have (1) and (2). * Both A and B are odd. * The following computations ensure that * @@ -363,7 +365,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, { BIGNUM *tmp; - /* + /*- * 0 < B < A, * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) @@ -410,7 +412,8 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, if (!BN_div(D,M,A,B,ctx)) goto err; } - /* Now + /*- + * Now * A = D*B + M; * thus we have * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|). @@ -423,7 +426,8 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, B=M; /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */ - /* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, + /*- + * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, * (**) translates into * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|), * i.e. @@ -476,7 +480,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, } } - /* + /*- * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when * A == gcd(a,n); * we have @@ -565,7 +569,8 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx)) goto err; } sign = -1; - /* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that + /*- + * From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that * * 0 <= B < A, * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), @@ -576,7 +581,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, { BIGNUM *tmp; - /* + /*- * 0 < B < A, * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|) @@ -591,7 +596,8 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */ if (!BN_div(D,M,pA,B,ctx)) goto err; - /* Now + /*- + * Now * A = D*B + M; * thus we have * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|). @@ -604,7 +610,8 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, B=M; /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */ - /* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, + /*- + * Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A, * (**) translates into * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|), * i.e. @@ -632,7 +639,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, sign = -sign; } - /* + /*- * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when * A == gcd(a,n); * we have diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h index 260f67b..993579e 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* Bignum consistency macros +/*- + * Bignum consistency macros * There is one "API" macro, bn_fix_top(), for stripping leading zeroes from * bignum data after direct manipulations on the data. There is also an * "internal" macro, bn_check_top(), for verifying that there are no leading @@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ struct bn_gencb_st }; -/* +/*- * BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size -- macro for sliding window mod_exp functions * * diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c index f0b449d..886de0d 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c @@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ const char BN_version[]="Big Number" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; /* This stuff appears to be completely unused, so is deprecated */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -/* For a 32 bit machine +/*- + * For a 32 bit machine * 2 - 4 == 128 * 3 - 8 == 256 * 4 - 16 == 512 diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c index dde0919..a98e607 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c @@ -348,7 +348,8 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_part_words(BN_ULONG *r, /* Karatsuba recursive multiplication algorithm * (cf. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2) */ -/* r is 2*n2 words in size, +/*- + * r is 2*n2 words in size, * a and b are both n2 words in size. * n2 must be a power of 2. * We multiply and return the result. @@ -466,7 +467,8 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]),&(a[n]),&(b[n]),n,dna,dnb,p); } - /* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign + /*- + * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ @@ -483,7 +485,8 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, c1+=(int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]),&(t[n2]),t,n2)); } - /* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) + /*- + * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits @@ -638,7 +641,8 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, } } - /* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign + /*- + * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ @@ -655,7 +659,8 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, c1+=(int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]),&(t[n2]),t,n2)); } - /* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) + /*- + * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits @@ -682,7 +687,8 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n, } } -/* a and b must be the same size, which is n2. +/*- + * a and b must be the same size, which is n2. * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2 */ void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, @@ -707,7 +713,8 @@ void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2, } } -/* a and b must be the same size, which is n2. +/*- + * a and b must be the same size, which is n2. * r needs to be n2 words and t needs to be n2*2 * l is the low words of the output. * t needs to be n2*3 @@ -775,7 +782,8 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2, bn_mul_recursive(r,&(a[n]),&(b[n]),n,0,0,&(t[n2])); } - /* s0 == low(al*bl) + /*- + * s0 == low(al*bl) * s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl) * We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl) * high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl)) @@ -812,16 +820,19 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2, lp[i]=((~mp[i])+1)&BN_MASK2; } - /* s[0] = low(al*bl) + /*- + * s[0] = low(al*bl) * t[3] = high(al*bl) * t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign * r[10] = (a[1]*b[1]) */ - /* R[10] = al*bl + /*- + * R[10] = al*bl * R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) * R[32] = ah*bh */ - /* R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow) + /*- + * R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow) * R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow) * R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow) */ diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c index 2d66b61..9f39005 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c @@ -524,7 +524,8 @@ loop: { BN_ULONG rnd_word = BN_get_word(rnd); - /* In the case that the candidate prime is a single word then + /*- + * In the case that the candidate prime is a single word then * we check that: * 1) It's greater than primes[i] because we shouldn't reject * 3 as being a prime number because it's a multiple of @@ -532,7 +533,8 @@ loop: * 2) That it's not a multiple of a known prime. We don't * check that rnd-1 is also coprime to all the known * primes because there aren't many small primes where - * that's true. */ + * that's true. + */ for (i=1; i<NUMPRIMES && primes[i]<rnd_word; i++) { if ((mods[i]+delta)%primes[i] == 0) diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c index f99e1b4..372a01f 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c @@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, i,ctx); /* BN_reciprocal returns i, or -1 for an error */ if (recp->shift == -1) goto err; - /* d := |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * recp->Nr / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))| + /*- + * d := |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * recp->Nr / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))| * = |round(round(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * round(2^i / N) / 2^(i - BN_num_bits(N)))| * <= |(m / 2^BN_num_bits(N)) * (2^i / N) * (2^BN_num_bits(N) / 2^i)| * = |m/N| diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c index 74d7df6..57da1e4 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c @@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp) } #ifdef BN_RECURSION -/* r is 2*n words in size, +/*- + * r is 2*n words in size, * a and b are both n words in size. (There's not actually a 'b' here ...) * n must be a power of 2. * We multiply and return the result. @@ -249,7 +250,8 @@ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) bn_sqr_recursive(r,a,n,p); bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]),&(a[n]),n,p); - /* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero + /*- + * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0]) * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1]) */ @@ -259,7 +261,8 @@ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t) /* t[32] is negative */ c1-=(int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]),t,&(t[n2]),n2)); - /* t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1]) + /*- + * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1]) * r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0]) * r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1]) * c1 holds the carry bits diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c index 6beaf9e..04cf4a0 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c @@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) if (e == 1) { - /* The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse + /*- + * The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse * modulo (|p|-1)/2, and square roots can be computed * directly by modular exponentiation. * We have @@ -152,7 +153,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) if (e == 2) { - /* |p| == 5 (mod 8) + /*- + * |p| == 5 (mod 8) * * In this case 2 is always a non-square since * Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime. @@ -262,7 +264,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) goto end; } - /* Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer + /*- + * Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer * k, 0 <= k < 2^e, such that * * a^q * y^k == 1 (mod p). @@ -318,7 +321,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) while (1) { - /* Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E + /*- + * Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E * where E refers to the original value of e, which we * don't keep in a variable), and x is a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2). * diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c index ff55876..7204c09 100644 --- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c +++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c @@ -601,7 +601,8 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from) } e++; } - /* So at this point we have + /*- + * So at this point we have * np which is the start of the name string which is * '\0' terminated. * cp which is the start of the section string which is diff --git a/crypto/constant_time_locl.h b/crypto/constant_time_locl.h index 8af98c1..6410ca7 100644 --- a/crypto/constant_time_locl.h +++ b/crypto/constant_time_locl.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* crypto/constant_time_locl.h */ -/* +/*- * Utilities for constant-time cryptography. * * Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org) @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* +/*- * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true * and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result * of a conditional in constant time. For example, @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b); static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b); -/* +/*- * Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b). * * When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above), diff --git a/crypto/constant_time_test.c b/crypto/constant_time_test.c index d9c6a44..82c2d96 100644 --- a/crypto/constant_time_test.c +++ b/crypto/constant_time_test.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* crypto/constant_time_test.c */ -/* +/*- * Utilities for constant-time cryptography. * * Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org) diff --git a/crypto/crypto.h b/crypto/crypto.h index d4be37b..f5cb4c7 100644 --- a/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/crypto/crypto.h @@ -525,7 +525,8 @@ int CRYPTO_remove_all_info(void); void CRYPTO_dbg_malloc(void *addr,int num,const char *file,int line,int before_p); void CRYPTO_dbg_realloc(void *addr1,void *addr2,int num,const char *file,int line,int before_p); void CRYPTO_dbg_free(void *addr,int before_p); -/* Tell the debugging code about options. By default, the following values +/*- + * Tell the debugging code about options. By default, the following values * apply: * * 0: Clear all options. diff --git a/crypto/des/des_locl.h b/crypto/des/des_locl.h index 5b53da9..3075c72 100644 --- a/crypto/des/des_locl.h +++ b/crypto/des/des_locl.h @@ -362,7 +362,8 @@ #endif #endif - /* IP and FP + /*- + * IP and FP * The problem is more of a geometric problem that random bit fiddling. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 diff --git a/crypto/des/des_old.h b/crypto/des/des_old.h index fab1c06..33169ad 100644 --- a/crypto/des/des_old.h +++ b/crypto/des/des_old.h @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ /* crypto/des/des_old.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ -/* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING +/*- + * WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING * * The function names in here are deprecated and are only present to * provide an interface compatible with openssl 0.9.6 and older as diff --git a/crypto/des/destest.c b/crypto/des/destest.c index 64b92a3..b5bcf8f 100644 --- a/crypto/des/destest.c +++ b/crypto/des/destest.c @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) DES_ENCRYPT); DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(&cbc_data[16],&cbc_out[16],i-16,&ks,&ks2,&ks3, &iv3,&iv2,DES_ENCRYPT); - /* if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok, + /*- if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok, (unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0) { printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n"); diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_read.c b/crypto/des/enc_read.c index edb6620..e6c4769 100644 --- a/crypto/des/enc_read.c +++ b/crypto/des/enc_read.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,DES_rw_mode,DES_PCBC_MODE) -/* +/*- * WARNINGS: * * - The data format used by DES_enc_write() and DES_enc_read() diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c index 2353ac1..cd5d676 100644 --- a/crypto/des/enc_writ.c +++ b/crypto/des/enc_writ.c @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ #include "des_locl.h" #include <openssl/rand.h> -/* +/*- * WARNINGS: * * - The data format used by DES_enc_write() and DES_enc_read() diff --git a/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c b/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c index fda23d5..fdd8655 100644 --- a/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c +++ b/crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* crypto/des/ncbc_enc.c */ -/* +/*- * #included by: * cbc_enc.c (DES_cbc_encrypt) * des_enc.c (DES_ncbc_encrypt) diff --git a/crypto/des/rpc_des.h b/crypto/des/rpc_des.h index 41328d7..94a1d11 100644 --- a/crypto/des/rpc_des.h +++ b/crypto/des/rpc_des.h @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ */ /* @(#)des.h 2.2 88/08/10 4.0 RPCSRC; from 2.7 88/02/08 SMI */ -/* +/*- * Sun RPC is a product of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and is provided for * unrestricted use provided that this legend is included on all tape * media and as a part of the software program in whole or part. Users diff --git a/crypto/des/set_key.c b/crypto/des/set_key.c index ce4faf2..37dec3c 100644 --- a/crypto/des/set_key.c +++ b/crypto/des/set_key.c @@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ int DES_check_key_parity(const_DES_cblock *key) return(1); } -/* Weak and semi week keys as take from +/*- + * Weak and semi week keys as take from * %A D.W. Davies * %A W.L. Price * %T Security for Computer Networks @@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule) { return(DES_set_key(key,schedule)); } -/* +/*- #undef des_fixup_key_parity void des_fixup_key_parity(des_cblock *key) { diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c index 9c4f613..0acd775 100644 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/dh.h> -/* Check that p is a safe prime and +/*- + * Check that p is a safe prime and * if g is 2, 3 or 5, check that it is a suitable generator * where * for 2, p mod 24 == 11 diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c index 3da2792..1d3cbe8 100644 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator, BN_GENCB *c return dh_builtin_genparams(ret, prime_len, generator, cb); } -/* We generate DH parameters as follows +/*- + * We generate DH parameters as follows * find a prime q which is prime_len/2 bits long. * p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q * For this case, g is a generator if diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c index 61a1b01..b8394fd 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c @@ -213,7 +213,8 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) goto decerr; if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2) goto decerr; - /* Handle Two broken types: + /*- + * Handle Two broken types: * SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key} * SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key} */ diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c index 9e441fa..55c75b5 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, } /* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */ -/* returns +/*- + * returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c index ff29e55..dc8afa5 100644 --- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c @@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ NULL, NULL }; -/* These macro wrappers replace attempts to use the dsa_mod_exp() and +/*- + * These macro wrappers replace attempts to use the dsa_mod_exp() and * bn_mod_exp() handlers in the DSA_METHOD structure. We avoid the problem of * having a the macro work as an expression by bundling an "err_instr". So; * diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c index 868513c..d08de5e 100644 --- a/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c +++ b/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c @@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso) goto err; } - /* A file specification may look like this: + /*- + * A file specification may look like this: * * node::dev:[dir-spec]name.type;ver * diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec.h b/crypto/ec/ec.h index f448aac..477e476 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec.h +++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ typedef enum { typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD; typedef struct ec_group_st - /* + /*- EC_METHOD *meth; -- field definition -- curve coefficients diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c index cc3ec83..c261b81 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c @@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ static int gf2m_Madd(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *x1, BIGNUM return ret; } -/* Compute the x, y affine coordinates from the point (x1, z1) (x2, z2) +/*- + * Compute the x, y affine coordinates from the point (x1, z1) (x2, z2) * using Montgomery point multiplication algorithm Mxy() in appendix of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717). @@ -212,7 +213,8 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIG } -/* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r. +/*- + * Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r. * point can not equal r. * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of * Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over @@ -318,7 +320,8 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, } -/* Computes the sum +/*- + * Computes the sum * scalar*group->generator + scalars[0]*points[0] + ... + scalars[num-1]*points[num-1] * gracefully ignoring NULL scalar values. */ diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c index 0bf87e6..7160360 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c @@ -586,7 +586,8 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_ lh = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (lh == NULL) goto err; - /* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation + /*- + * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation * y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b. * <=> x^3 + a*x^2 + x*y + b + y^2 = 0 * <=> ((x + a) * x + y ) * x + b + y^2 = 0 @@ -606,7 +607,8 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_ } -/* Indicates whether two points are equal. +/*- + * Indicates whether two points are equal. * Return values: * -1 error * 0 equal (in affine coordinates) diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h index abd73ee..b7982d9 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h @@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ struct ec_method_st { void (*point_clear_finish)(EC_POINT *); int (*point_copy)(EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *); - /* used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity, + /*- + * used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity, * EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, * EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp, * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m, diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c index 3b5be30..eb83c62 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c @@ -482,7 +482,8 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group))) goto err; - /* prepare precomputed values: + /*- + * prepare precomputed values: * val_sub[i][0] := points[i] * val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i] * val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i] @@ -607,7 +608,8 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, } -/* ec_wNAF_precompute_mult() +/*- + * ec_wNAF_precompute_mult() * creates an EC_PRE_COMP object with preprecomputed multiples of the generator * for use with wNAF splitting as implemented in ec_wNAF_mul(). * diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c index bf8021c..4c76827 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ typedef int64_t s64; /******************************************************************************/ -/* INTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF FIELD ELEMENTS +/*- + * INTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF FIELD ELEMENTS * * Field elements are represented as a_0 + 2^56*a_1 + 2^112*a_2 + 2^168*a_3 * using 64-bit coefficients called 'limbs', @@ -94,7 +95,8 @@ static const felem_bytearray nistp224_curve_params[5] = { 0x44,0xd5,0x81,0x99,0x85,0x00,0x7e,0x34} }; -/* Precomputed multiples of the standard generator +/*- + * Precomputed multiples of the standard generator * Points are given in coordinates (X, Y, Z) where Z normally is 1 * (0 for the point at infinity). * For each field element, slice a_0 is word 0, etc. @@ -573,9 +575,11 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in) /* output[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 */ out[2] = output[2] & 0x00ffffffffffffff; - /* out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56, + /*- + * out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56, * out[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 (due to final carry), - * so out < 2*p */ + * so out < 2*p + */ out[3] = output[3]; } @@ -752,13 +756,15 @@ copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb icopy) * */ -/* Double an elliptic curve point: +/*- + * Double an elliptic curve point: * (X', Y', Z') = 2 * (X, Y, Z), where * X' = (3 * (X - Z^2) * (X + Z^2))^2 - 8 * X * Y^2 * Y' = 3 * (X - Z^2) * (X + Z^2) * (4 * X * Y^2 - X') - 8 * Y^2 * Z' = (Y + Z)^2 - Y^2 - Z^2 = 2 * Y * Z * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed, - * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */ + * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). + */ static void point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in) @@ -830,7 +836,8 @@ point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, felem_reduce(y_out, tmp); } -/* Add two elliptic curve points: +/*- + * Add two elliptic curve points: * (X_1, Y_1, Z_1) + (X_2, Y_2, Z_2) = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3), where * X_3 = (Z_1^3 * Y_2 - Z_2^3 * Y_1)^2 - (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^3 - * 2 * Z_2^2 * X_1 * (Z_1^2 * X_2 - Z_2^2 * X_1)^2 @@ -968,8 +975,10 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2); /* ftmp5[i] < 2 * 2^57 = 2^58 */ - /* x_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 - - 2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 */ + /*- + * x_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 - + * 2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 + */ felem_diff_128_64(tmp2, ftmp5); /* tmp2[i] < 2^117 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^118 */ felem_reduce(x_out, tmp2); @@ -982,8 +991,10 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp3, ftmp2); /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^59 = 2^118 */ - /* y_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out) - - z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 */ + /*- + * y_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out) - + * z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 + */ widefelem_diff(tmp2, tmp); /* tmp2[i] < 2^118 + 2^120 < 2^121 */ felem_reduce(y_out, tmp2); diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c index 2f9bb57..cd87161 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c @@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ static const felem_bytearray nistp256_curve_params[5] = { 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5} }; -/* The representation of field elements. +/*- + * The representation of field elements. * ------------------------------------ * * We represent field elements with either four 128-bit values, eight 128-bit @@ -248,7 +249,8 @@ static void longfelem_scalar(longfelem out, const u64 scalar) /* zero105 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero105 = { two105m41m9, two105, two105m41p9, two105m41p9 }; -/* smallfelem_neg sets |out| to |-small| +/*- + * smallfelem_neg sets |out| to |-small| * On exit: * out[i] < out[i] + 2^105 */ @@ -261,7 +263,8 @@ static void smallfelem_neg(felem out, const smallfelem small) out[3] = zero105[3] - small[3]; } -/* felem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| +/*- + * felem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^104 * On exit: @@ -288,7 +291,8 @@ static void felem_diff(felem out, const felem in) /* zero107 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero107 = { two107m43m11, two107, two107m43p11, two107m43p11 }; -/* An alternative felem_diff for larger inputs |in| +/*- + * An alternative felem_diff for larger inputs |in| * felem_diff_zero107 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^106 @@ -309,7 +313,8 @@ static void felem_diff_zero107(felem out, const felem in) out[3] -= in[3]; } -/* longfelem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| +/*- + * longfelem_diff subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 7*2^67 * On exit: @@ -352,7 +357,8 @@ static void longfelem_diff(longfelem out, const longfelem in) /* zero110 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero110 = { two64m0, two110p32m0, two64m46, two64m32 }; -/* felem_shrink converts an felem into a smallfelem. The result isn't quite +/*- + * felem_shrink converts an felem into a smallfelem. The result isn't quite * minimal as the value may be greater than p. * * On entry: @@ -404,12 +410,14 @@ static void felem_shrink(smallfelem out, const felem in) /* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */ high <<= 63; high >>= 63; - /* high is: + /*- + * high is: * all ones if the high word of tmp[3] is 1 * all zeros if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */ low = tmp[3]; mask = low >> 63; - /* mask is: + /*- + * mask is: * all ones if the MSB of low is 1 * all zeros if the MSB of low if 0 */ low &= bottom63bits; @@ -417,7 +425,8 @@ static void felem_shrink(smallfelem out, const felem in) /* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */ low = ~low; low >>= 63; - /* low is: + /*- + * low is: * all ones if low was > kPrime3Test * all zeros if low was <= kPrime3Test */ mask = (mask & low) | high; @@ -447,7 +456,8 @@ static void smallfelem_expand(felem out, const smallfelem in) out[3] = in[3]; } -/* smallfelem_square sets |out| = |small|^2 +/*- + * smallfelem_square sets |out| = |small|^2 * On entry: * small[i] < 2^64 * On exit: @@ -525,7 +535,8 @@ static void smallfelem_square(longfelem out, const smallfelem small) out[7] = high; } -/* felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2 +/*- + * felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2 * On entry: * in[i] < 2^109 * On exit: @@ -538,7 +549,8 @@ static void felem_square(longfelem out, const felem in) smallfelem_square(out, small); } -/* smallfelem_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |small2| +/*- + * smallfelem_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |small2| * On entry: * small1[i] < 2^64 * small2[i] < 2^64 @@ -653,7 +665,8 @@ static void smallfelem_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1, const smallfe out[7] = high; } -/* felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2| +/*- + * felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2| * On entry: * in1[i] < 2^109 * in2[i] < 2^109 @@ -668,7 +681,8 @@ static void felem_mul(longfelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) smallfelem_mul(out, small1, small2); } -/* felem_small_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |in2| +/*- + * felem_small_mul sets |out| = |small1| * |in2| * On entry: * small1[i] < 2^64 * in2[i] < 2^109 @@ -688,7 +702,8 @@ static void felem_small_mul(longfelem out, const smallfelem small1, const felem /* zero100 is 0 mod p */ static const felem zero100 = { two100m36m4, two100, two100m36p4, two100m36p4 }; -/* Internal function for the different flavours of felem_reduce. +/*- + * Internal function for the different flavours of felem_reduce. * felem_reduce_ reduces the higher coefficients in[4]-in[7]. * On entry: * out[0] >= in[6] + 2^32*in[6] + in[7] + 2^32*in[7] @@ -735,7 +750,8 @@ static void felem_reduce_(felem out, const longfelem in) out[3] += (in[7] * 3); } -/* felem_reduce converts a longfelem into an felem. +/*- + * felem_reduce converts a longfelem into an felem. * To be called directly after felem_square or felem_mul. * On entry: * in[0] < 2^64, in[1] < 3*2^64, in[2] < 5*2^64, in[3] < 7*2^64 @@ -752,7 +768,8 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const longfelem in) felem_reduce_(out, in); - /* out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0 + /*- + * out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0 * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0 * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0 * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0 @@ -764,7 +781,8 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const longfelem in) */ } -/* felem_reduce_zero105 converts a larger longfelem into an felem. +/*- + * felem_reduce_zero105 converts a larger longfelem into an felem. * On entry: * in[0] < 2^71 * On exit: @@ -779,7 +797,8 @@ static void felem_reduce_zero105(felem out, const longfelem in) felem_reduce_(out, in); - /* out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 + /*- + * out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0 * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0 @@ -881,7 +900,8 @@ static void smallfelem_mul_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in1, const felem_contract(out, tmp); } -/* felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0 +/*- + * felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0 * otherwise. * On entry: * small[i] < 2^64 @@ -926,7 +946,8 @@ static int smallfelem_is_zero_int(const smallfelem small) return (int) (smallfelem_is_zero(small) & ((limb)1)); } -/* felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} +/*- + * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} * * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem: * a^p = a (mod p) @@ -1005,14 +1026,16 @@ static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in) felem_contract(out, tmp); } -/* Group operations +/*- + * Group operations * ---------------- * * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian * coordinates */ -/* point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in) +/*- + * point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in) * * The method is taken from: * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b @@ -1140,7 +1163,8 @@ copy_small_conditional(felem out, const smallfelem in, limb mask) } } -/* point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) +/*- + * point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) * * The method is taken from: * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl, @@ -1329,7 +1353,8 @@ static void point_add_small(smallfelem x3, smallfelem y3, smallfelem z3, felem_shrink(z3, felem_z3); } -/* Base point pre computation +/*- + * Base point pre computation * -------------------------- * * Two different sorts of precomputed tables are used in the following code. diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c index 178b655..7ff3a0b 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c @@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ static const felem_bytearray nistp521_curve_params[5] = 0x66, 0x50} }; -/* The representation of field elements. +/*- + * The representation of field elements. * ------------------------------------ * * We represent field elements with nine values. These values are either 64 or @@ -291,7 +292,8 @@ static void felem_scalar128(largefelem out, limb scalar) out[8] *= scalar; } -/* felem_neg sets |out| to |-in| +/*- + * felem_neg sets |out| to |-in| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 * On exit: @@ -314,7 +316,8 @@ static void felem_neg(felem out, const felem in) out[8] = two62m2 - in[8]; } -/* felem_diff64 subtracts |in| from |out| +/*- + * felem_diff64 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 * On exit: @@ -337,7 +340,8 @@ static void felem_diff64(felem out, const felem in) out[8] += two62m2 - in[8]; } -/* felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out| +/*- + * felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^62 + 2^17 * On exit: @@ -360,7 +364,8 @@ static void felem_diff_128_64(largefelem out, const felem in) out[8] += two63m5 - in[8]; } -/* felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out| +/*- + * felem_diff_128_64 subtracts |in| from |out| * On entry: * in[i] < 2^126 * On exit: @@ -383,7 +388,8 @@ static void felem_diff128(largefelem out, const largefelem in) out[8] += (two127m69 - in[8]); } -/* felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2 +/*- + * felem_square sets |out| = |in|^2 * On entry: * in[i] < 2^62 * On exit: @@ -395,7 +401,8 @@ static void felem_square(largefelem out, const felem in) felem_scalar(inx2, in, 2); felem_scalar(inx4, in, 4); - /* We have many cases were we want to do + /*- + * We have many cases were we want to do * in[x] * in[y] + * in[y] * in[x] * This is obviously just @@ -474,7 +481,8 @@ static void felem_square(largefelem out, const felem in) out[7] += ((uint128_t) in[8]) * inx2[8]; } -/* felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2| +/*- + * felem_mul sets |out| = |in1| * |in2| * On entry: * in1[i] < 2^64 * in2[i] < 2^63 @@ -589,7 +597,8 @@ static void felem_mul(largefelem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) static const limb bottom52bits = 0xfffffffffffff; -/* felem_reduce converts a largefelem to an felem. +/*- + * felem_reduce converts a largefelem to an felem. * On entry: * in[i] < 2^128 * On exit: @@ -677,7 +686,8 @@ static void felem_mul_reduce(felem out, const felem in1, const felem in2) felem_reduce(out, tmp); } -/* felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} +/*- + * felem_inv calculates |out| = |in|^{-1} * * Based on Fermat's Little Theorem: * a^p = a (mod p) @@ -769,7 +779,8 @@ static const felem kPrime = 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x03ffffffffffffff, 0x01ffffffffffffff }; -/* felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0 +/*- + * felem_is_zero returns a limb with all bits set if |in| == 0 (mod p) and 0 * otherwise. * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 @@ -834,7 +845,8 @@ static int felem_is_zero_int(const felem in) return (int) (felem_is_zero(in) & ((limb)1)); } -/* felem_contract converts |in| to its unique, minimal representation. +/*- + * felem_contract converts |in| to its unique, minimal representation. * On entry: * in[i] < 2^59 + 2^14 */ @@ -930,14 +942,16 @@ static void felem_contract(felem out, const felem in) sign = -(out[7] >> 63); out[7] += (two58 & sign); out[8] -= (1 & sign); } -/* Group operations +/*- + * Group operations * ---------------- * * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian * coordinates */ -/* point_double calcuates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in) +/*- + * point_double calcuates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in) * * The method is taken from: * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b @@ -974,11 +988,13 @@ point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, felem_scalar64(ftmp2, 3); /* ftmp2[i] < 3*2^60 + 3*2^15 */ felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2); - /* tmp[i] < 17(3*2^121 + 3*2^76) + /*- + * tmp[i] < 17(3*2^121 + 3*2^76) * = 61*2^121 + 61*2^76 * < 64*2^121 + 64*2^76 * = 2^127 + 2^82 - * < 2^128 */ + * < 2^128 + */ felem_reduce(alpha, tmp); /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */ @@ -1011,22 +1027,30 @@ point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out, felem_diff64(beta, x_out); /* beta[i] < 2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16 */ felem_mul(tmp, alpha, beta); - /* tmp[i] < 17*((2^59 + 2^14)(2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16)) + /*- + * tmp[i] < 17*((2^59 + 2^14)(2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16)) * = 17*(2^120 + 2^75 + 2^119 + 2^74 + 2^75 + 2^30) * = 17*(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30) - * < 2^128 */ + * < 2^128 + */ felem_square(tmp2, gamma); - /* tmp2[i] < 17*(2^59 + 2^14)^2 - * = 17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28) */ + /*- + * tmp2[i] < 17*(2^59 + 2^14)^2 + * = 17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28) + */ felem_scalar128(tmp2, 8); - /* tmp2[i] < 8*17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28) + /*- + * tmp2[i] < 8*17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28) * = 2^125 + 2^121 + 2^81 + 2^77 + 2^35 + 2^31 - * < 2^126 */ + * < 2^126 + */ felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2); - /* tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30) + /*- + * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30) * = 2^127 + 2^124 + 2^122 + 2^120 + 2^118 + 2^80 + 2^78 + 2^76 + * 2^74 + 2^69 + 2^34 + 2^30 - * < 2^128 */ + * < 2^128 + */ felem_reduce(y_out, tmp); } @@ -1042,7 +1066,8 @@ copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask) } } -/* point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) +/*- + * point_add calcuates (x1, y1, z1) + (x2, y2, z2) * * The method is taken from * http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl, @@ -1205,7 +1230,8 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3, felem_assign(z3, z_out); } -/* Base point pre computation +/*- + * Base point pre computation * -------------------------- * * Two different sorts of precomputed tables are used in the following code. diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c index c8140c8..4ab42d8 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistputil.c @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array, } } -/* +/*- * This function looks at 5+1 scalar bits (5 current, 1 adjacent less * significant bit), and recodes them into a signed digit for use in fast point * multiplication: the use of signed rather than unsigned digits means that diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c index c2192b3..bd9f7df 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c @@ -320,9 +320,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) if (!BN_copy(b, group->b)) goto err; } - /* check the discriminant: + /*- + * check the discriminant: * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p) - * 0 =< a, b < p */ + * 0 =< a, b < p + */ if (BN_is_zero(a)) { if (BN_is_zero(b)) goto err; @@ -975,7 +977,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_C Z6 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Z6 == NULL) goto err; - /* We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation + /*- + * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b. * The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates * where (X, Y, Z) represents (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3). @@ -1081,7 +1084,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT * Zb23 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (Zb23 == NULL) goto end; - /* We have to decide whether + /*- + * We have to decide whether * (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3), * or equivalently, whether * (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3). diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c index ef9acf7..ae14625 100644 --- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c +++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ #include <openssl/engine.h> #endif -/* returns +/*- + * returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error @@ -75,7 +76,8 @@ int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, return ecdsa->meth->ecdsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey); } -/* returns +/*- + * returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_all.c b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c index 63bd1f5..fa6febf 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_all.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_4758_CCA ENGINE_load_4758cca(); #endif -/* +/*- * These engines have been disabled as they do not currently build #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_AEP ENGINE_load_aep(); diff --git a/crypto/engine/engine.h b/crypto/engine/engine.h index 5d382fa..a6f5dbc 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/engine.h +++ b/crypto/engine/engine.h @@ -291,7 +291,8 @@ typedef EVP_PKEY * (*ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR)(ENGINE *, const char *, typedef int (*ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR)(ENGINE *, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); -/* These callback types are for an ENGINE's handler for cipher and digest logic. +/*- + * These callback types are for an ENGINE's handler for cipher and digest logic. * These handlers have these prototypes; * int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid); * int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid); @@ -359,13 +360,14 @@ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void); void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags); -/* Manage registration of ENGINEs per "table". For each type, there are 3 +/*- Manage registration of ENGINEs per "table". For each type, there are 3 * functions; * ENGINE_register_***(e) - registers the implementation from 'e' (if it has one) * ENGINE_unregister_***(e) - unregister the implementation from 'e' * ENGINE_register_all_***() - call ENGINE_register_***() for each 'e' in the list * Cleanup is automatically registered from each table when required, so - * ENGINE_cleanup() will reverse any "register" operations. */ + * ENGINE_cleanup() will reverse any "register" operations. + */ int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e); diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c b/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c index 3cf75f0..2ceb802 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c +++ b/crypto/evp/bio_enc.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static long enc_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, bio_info_cb *fp) return(ret); } -/* +/*- void BIO_set_cipher_ctx(b,c) BIO *b; EVP_CIPHER_ctx *c; diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_md.c b/crypto/evp/bio_md.c index 144fdfd..6190156 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/bio_md.c +++ b/crypto/evp/bio_md.c @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int md_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) return((int)ret); } -/* +/*- static int md_puts(bp,str) BIO *bp; char *str; diff --git a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c index ad8cad8..973439a 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c +++ b/crypto/evp/bio_ok.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ -/* +/*- From: Arne Ansper <arne@cyber.ee> Why BIO_f_reliable? diff --git a/crypto/evp/encode.c b/crypto/evp/encode.c index a4f7674..e612fd1 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/encode.c +++ b/crypto/evp/encode.c @@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ #define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f]) #endif -/* 64 char lines +/*- + * 64 char lines * pad input with 0 * left over chars are set to = * 1 byte => xx== @@ -88,7 +89,8 @@ static const unsigned char data_bin2ascii[65]="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ\ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; -/* 0xF0 is a EOLN +/*- + * 0xF0 is a EOLN * 0xF1 is ignore but next needs to be 0xF0 (for \r\n processing). * 0xF2 is EOF * 0xE0 is ignore at start of line. @@ -228,7 +230,8 @@ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx) ctx->expect_nl=0; } -/* -1 for error +/*- + * -1 for error * 0 for last line * 1 for full line */ diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/evp/evp.h index 757b796..7290c10 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp.h +++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ #include <openssl/bio.h> #endif -/* +/*- #define EVP_RC2_KEY_SIZE 16 #define EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE 16 #define EVP_BLOWFISH_KEY_SIZE 16 diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h b/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h index 94162d6..cff2942 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_locl.h @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ BLOCK_CIPHER_def_ecb(cname, kstruct, nid, block_size, key_len, flags, \ init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl) -/* +/*- #define BLOCK_CIPHER_defs(cname, kstruct, \ nid, block_size, key_len, iv_len, flags,\ init_key, cleanup, set_asn1, get_asn1, ctrl)\ diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_seal.c b/crypto/evp/p_seal.c index e5919b0..6658302 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/p_seal.c +++ b/crypto/evp/p_seal.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek return(npubk); } -/* MACRO +/*- MACRO void EVP_SealUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; unsigned char *out; diff --git a/crypto/idea/ideatest.c b/crypto/idea/ideatest.c index d509f81..9764c0c 100644 --- a/crypto/idea/ideatest.c +++ b/crypto/idea/ideatest.c @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE]={ 0x2C,0x17,0x25,0xD0,0x1A,0x38,0xB7,0x2A, 0x39,0x61,0x37,0xDC,0x79,0xFB,0x9F,0x45 -/* 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38, +/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38, 0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9, 0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/ }; diff --git a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c index 9167a8d..e3003ad 100644 --- a/crypto/jpake/jpake.c +++ b/crypto/jpake/jpake.c @@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ int JPAKE_STEP2_generate(JPAKE_STEP2 *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx) BIGNUM *t1 = BN_new(); BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new(); - /* + /*- * X = g^{(xa + xc + xd) * xb * s} * t1 = g^xa */ @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int JPAKE_STEP2_generate(JPAKE_STEP2 *send, JPAKE_CTX *ctx) /* t2 = xb * s */ BN_mod_mul(t2, ctx->xb, ctx->secret, ctx->p.q, ctx->ctx); - /* + /*- * ZKP(xb * s) * XXX: this is kinda funky, because we're using * @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static int compute_key(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *gx) BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new(); BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new(); - /* + /*- * K = (gx/g^{xb * xd * s})^{xb} * = (g^{(xc + xa + xb) * xd * s - xb * xd *s})^{xb} * = (g^{(xa + xc) * xd * s})^{xb} @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ int JPAKE_STEP2_process(JPAKE_CTX *ctx, const JPAKE_STEP2 *received) BIGNUM *t2 = BN_new(); int ret = 0; - /* + /*- * g' = g^{xc + xa + xb} [from our POV] * t1 = xa + xb */ diff --git a/crypto/jpake/jpaketest.c b/crypto/jpake/jpaketest.c index eaba75e..a183262 100644 --- a/crypto/jpake/jpaketest.c +++ b/crypto/jpake/jpaketest.c @@ -128,12 +128,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) ERR_load_crypto_strings(); - /* + /*- BN_hex2bn(&p, "fd7f53811d75122952df4a9c2eece4e7f611b7523cef4400c31e3f80b6512669455d402251fb593d8d58fabfc5f5ba30f6cb9b556cd7813b801d346ff26660b76b9950a5a49f9fe8047b1022c24fbba9d7feb7c61bf83b57e7c6a8a6150f04fb83f6d3c51ec3023554135a169132f675f3ae2b61d72aeff22203199dd14801c7"); BN_hex2bn(&g, "f7e1a085d69b3ddecbbcab5c36b857b97994afbbfa3aea82f9574c0b3d0782675159578ebad4594fe67107108180b449167123e84c281613b7cf09328cc8a6e13c167a8b547c8d28e0a3ae1e2bb3a675916ea37f0bfa213562f1fb627a01243bcca4f1bea8519089a883dfe15ae59f06928b665e807b552564014c3bfecf492a"); BN_hex2bn(&q, "9760508f15230bccb292b982a2eb840bf0581cf5"); */ - /* + /*- p = BN_new(); BN_generate_prime(p, 1024, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); */ diff --git a/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h b/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h index 41725d0..7d7868d 100644 --- a/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h +++ b/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h @@ -71,14 +71,14 @@ extern "C" { /* ASN.1 from Kerberos RFC 1510 -*/ + */ -/* EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { -** etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType -** kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -** cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext -** } -*/ +/*- EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + * etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType + * kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + * cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext + * } + */ typedef struct krb5_encdata_st { ASN1_INTEGER *etype; @@ -88,11 +88,11 @@ typedef struct krb5_encdata_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_ENCDATA) -/* PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { -** name-type[0] INTEGER, -** name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString -** } -*/ +/*- PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE { + * name-type[0] INTEGER, + * name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString + * } + */ typedef struct krb5_princname_st { ASN1_INTEGER *nametype; @@ -102,13 +102,13 @@ typedef struct krb5_princname_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_PRINCNAME) -/* Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { -** tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, -** realm[1] Realm, -** sname[2] PrincipalName, -** enc-part[3] EncryptedData -** } -*/ +/*- Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE { + * tkt-vno[0] INTEGER, + * realm[1] Realm, + * sname[2] PrincipalName, + * enc-part[3] EncryptedData + * } + */ typedef struct krb5_tktbody_st { ASN1_INTEGER *tktvno; @@ -121,17 +121,17 @@ typedef STACK_OF(KRB5_TKTBODY) KRB5_TICKET; DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_TKTBODY) -/* AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { -** pvno[0] INTEGER, -** msg-type[1] INTEGER, -** ap-options[2] APOptions, -** ticket[3] Ticket, -** authenticator[4] EncryptedData -** } -** -** APOptions ::= BIT STRING { -** reserved(0), use-session-key(1), mutual-required(2) } -*/ +/*- AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE { + * pvno[0] INTEGER, + * msg-type[1] INTEGER, + * ap-options[2] APOptions, + * ticket[3] Ticket, + * authenticator[4] EncryptedData + * } + * + * APOptions ::= BIT STRING { + * reserved(0), use-session-key(1), mutual-required(2) } + */ typedef struct krb5_ap_req_st { ASN1_INTEGER *pvno; @@ -148,11 +148,11 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_APREQBODY) /* Authenticator Stuff */ -/* Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { -** cksumtype[0] INTEGER, -** checksum[1] OCTET STRING -** } -*/ +/*- Checksum ::= SEQUENCE { + * cksumtype[0] INTEGER, + * checksum[1] OCTET STRING + * } + */ typedef struct krb5_checksum_st { ASN1_INTEGER *ctype; @@ -162,11 +162,11 @@ typedef struct krb5_checksum_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_CHECKSUM) -/* EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { -** keytype[0] INTEGER, -** keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING -** } -*/ +/*- EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * keytype[0] INTEGER, + * keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING + * } + */ typedef struct krb5_encryptionkey_st { ASN1_INTEGER *ktype; @@ -176,11 +176,11 @@ typedef struct krb5_encryptionkey_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_ENCKEY) -/* AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { -** ad-type[0] INTEGER, -** ad-data[1] OCTET STRING -** } -*/ +/*- AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + * ad-type[0] INTEGER, + * ad-data[1] OCTET STRING + * } + */ typedef struct krb5_authorization_st { ASN1_INTEGER *adtype; @@ -190,19 +190,19 @@ typedef struct krb5_authorization_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_AUTHDATA) -/* -- Unencrypted authenticator -** Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { -** authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, -** crealm[1] Realm, -** cname[2] PrincipalName, -** cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, -** cusec[4] INTEGER, -** ctime[5] KerberosTime, -** subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, -** seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -** authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL -** } -*/ +/*- -- Unencrypted authenticator + * Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE { + * authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER, + * crealm[1] Realm, + * cname[2] PrincipalName, + * cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL, + * cusec[4] INTEGER, + * ctime[5] KerberosTime, + * subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + * seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL, + * authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL + * } + */ typedef struct krb5_authenticator_st { ASN1_INTEGER *avno; @@ -220,15 +220,15 @@ typedef STACK_OF(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY) KRB5_AUTHENT; DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY) -/* DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) = DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) = -** type *name##_new(void); -** void name##_free(type *a); -** DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, name, name) = -** DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) = -** type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); -** int i2d_##name(type *a, unsigned char **out); -** DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(itname) = OPENSSL_EXTERN const ASN1_ITEM itname##_it -*/ +/*- DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) = DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) = + * type *name##_new(void); + * void name##_free(type *a); + * DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, name, name) = + * DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) = + * type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); + * int i2d_##name(type *a, unsigned char **out); + * DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(itname) = OPENSSL_EXTERN const ASN1_ITEM itname##_it + */ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_ENCDATA) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_PRINCNAME) diff --git a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c index 47f7480..a60914a 100644 --- a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c +++ b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c @@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ -/* Code for dynamic hash table routines +/*- + * Code for dynamic hash table routines * Author - Eric Young v 2.0 * * 2.2 eay - added #include "crypto.h" so the memory leak checking code is diff --git a/crypto/md32_common.h b/crypto/md32_common.h index 2146154..9388dad 100644 --- a/crypto/md32_common.h +++ b/crypto/md32_common.h @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * */ -/* +/*- * This is a generic 32 bit "collector" for message digest algorithms. * Whenever needed it collects input character stream into chunks of * 32 bit values and invokes a block function that performs actual hash diff --git a/crypto/md4/md4.h b/crypto/md4/md4.h index c3ed9b3..631c1b2 100644 --- a/crypto/md4/md4.h +++ b/crypto/md4/md4.h @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern "C" { #error MD4 is disabled. #endif -/* +/*- * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * ! MD4_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide. If it's wider, then ! * ! MD4_LONG_LOG2 has to be defined along. ! diff --git a/crypto/modes/gcm128.c b/crypto/modes/gcm128.c index 662b6ff..261dc59 100644 --- a/crypto/modes/gcm128.c +++ b/crypto/modes/gcm128.c @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ } \ } while(0) -/* +/*- * Even though permitted values for TABLE_BITS are 8, 4 and 1, it should * never be set to 8. 8 is effectively reserved for testing purposes. * TABLE_BITS>1 are lookup-table-driven implementations referred to as diff --git a/crypto/o_time.c b/crypto/o_time.c index 362e9e7..e02b651 100644 --- a/crypto/o_time.c +++ b/crypto/o_time.c @@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result) /* Since there was no gmtime_r() to do this stuff for us, we have to do it the hard way. */ { - /* The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date, + /*- + * The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date, if I remember correctly, which is November 17, 1858. Furthermore, time is measure in thenths of microseconds and stored in quadwords (64 bit integers). unix_epoch diff --git a/crypto/objects/objects.h b/crypto/objects/objects.h index bd0ee52..42d2457 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/objects.h +++ b/crypto/objects/objects.h @@ -639,7 +639,8 @@ #define NID_ripemd160WithRSA 119 #define OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,1L,2L -/* Taken from rfc2040 +/*- + * Taken from rfc2040 * RC5_CBC_Parameters ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER (v1_0(16)), * rounds INTEGER (8..127), @@ -1028,7 +1029,7 @@ const void * OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key,const void *base,int num, #define DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(type1, type2, nm) \ type2 * OBJ_bsearch_##nm(type1 *key, type2 const *base, int num) -/* +/*- * Unsolved problem: if a type is actually a pointer type, like * nid_triple is, then its impossible to get a const where you need * it. Consider: diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h index b2acebe..e033191 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp.h @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ extern "C" { #define OCSP_RESPID_KEY 0x400 #define OCSP_NOTIME 0x800 -/* CertID ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- CertID ::= SEQUENCE { * hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuer's DN * issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of Issuers public key (excluding the tag & length fields) @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_cert_id_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(OCSP_CERTID) -/* Request ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- Request ::= SEQUENCE { * reqCert CertID, * singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } */ @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(OCSP_ONEREQ) -/* TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE { * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, * requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL, * requestList SEQUENCE OF Request, @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_req_info_st STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *requestExtensions; } OCSP_REQINFO; -/* Signature ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- Signature ::= SEQUENCE { * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * signature BIT STRING, * certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_signature_st STACK_OF(X509) *certs; } OCSP_SIGNATURE; -/* OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE { * tbsRequest TBSRequest, * optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL } */ @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_request_st OCSP_SIGNATURE *optionalSignature; /* OPTIONAL */ } OCSP_REQUEST; -/* OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED { +/*- OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED { * successful (0), --Response has valid confirmations * malformedRequest (1), --Illegal confirmation request * internalError (2), --Internal error in issuer @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_request_st #define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SIGREQUIRED 5 #define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED 6 -/* ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE { * responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, * response OCTET STRING } */ @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_resp_bytes_st ASN1_OCTET_STRING *response; } OCSP_RESPBYTES; -/* OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { * responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus, * responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL } */ @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ struct ocsp_response_st OCSP_RESPBYTES *responseBytes; }; -/* ResponderID ::= CHOICE { +/*- ResponderID ::= CHOICE { * byName [1] Name, * byKey [2] KeyHash } */ @@ -211,11 +211,11 @@ struct ocsp_responder_id_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OCSP_RESPID) -/* KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key +/*- KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING --SHA-1 hash of responder's public key * --(excluding the tag and length fields) */ -/* RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { * revocationTime GeneralizedTime, * revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL } */ @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_revoked_info_st ASN1_ENUMERATED *revocationReason; } OCSP_REVOKEDINFO; -/* CertStatus ::= CHOICE { +/*- CertStatus ::= CHOICE { * good [0] IMPLICIT NULL, * revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo, * unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo } @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_cert_status_st } value; } OCSP_CERTSTATUS; -/* SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE { * certID CertID, * certStatus CertStatus, * thisUpdate GeneralizedTime, @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_single_response_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) -/* ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE { * version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, * responderID ResponderID, * producedAt GeneralizedTime, @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_response_data_st STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *responseExtensions; } OCSP_RESPDATA; -/* BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { * tbsResponseData ResponseData, * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * signature BIT STRING, @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_basic_response_st STACK_OF(X509) *certs; } OCSP_BASICRESP; -/* +/*- * CRLReason ::= ENUMERATED { * unspecified (0), * keyCompromise (1), @@ -329,7 +329,8 @@ typedef struct ocsp_basic_response_st #define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_CERTIFICATEHOLD 6 #define OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS_REMOVEFROMCRL 8 -/* CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- + * CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { * crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL, * crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, * crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } @@ -341,7 +342,8 @@ typedef struct ocsp_crl_id_st ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *crlTime; } OCSP_CRLID; -/* ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { +/*- + * ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { * issuer Name, * locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax OPTIONAL } */ diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h index 22b87f9..f40abf4 100644 --- a/crypto/opensslv.h +++ b/crypto/opensslv.h @@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* Numeric release version identifier: +/*- + * Numeric release version identifier: * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that. @@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ extern "C" { #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT -/* The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) +/*- + * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h b/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h index b7f1efa..7078637 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pkcs7.h @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ extern "C" { #undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO #endif -/* +/*- Encryption_ID DES-CBC Digest_ID MD5 Digest_Encryption_ID rsaEncryption diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c b/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c index 0a74e40..0f32094 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ #include <openssl/rand.h> #include <openssl/buffer.h> -/* +/*- * Query the EGD <URL: http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>. * * This module supplies three routines: diff --git a/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c b/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c index 0e11743..945b179 100644 --- a/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c +++ b/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE]={ 0x2C,0x17,0x25,0xD0,0x1A,0x38,0xB7,0x2A, 0x39,0x61,0x37,0xDC,0x79,0xFB,0x9F,0x45 -/* 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38, +/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38, 0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9, 0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/ }; diff --git a/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c b/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c index 0cc5ac4..ee0fe8d 100644 --- a/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c +++ b/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata, d=key->data; #if defined(RC4_CHUNK) && !defined(PEDANTIC) - /* + /*- * The original reason for implementing this(*) was the fact that * pre-21164a Alpha CPUs don't have byte load/store instructions * and e.g. a byte store has to be done with 64-bit load, shift, @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata, RC4_CHUNK ichunk,otp; const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1}; - /* + /*- * I reckon we can afford to implement both endian * cases and to decide which way to take at run-time * because the machine code appears to be very compact diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c index f890f89..4b79332 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash, hLen = M_EVP_MD_size(Hash); if (hLen < 0) goto err; - /* + /*- * Negative sLen has special meanings: * -1 sLen == hLen * -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM, hLen = M_EVP_MD_size(Hash); if (hLen < 0) goto err; - /* + /*- * Negative sLen has special meanings: * -1 sLen == hLen * -2 salt length is maximized diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha.h b/crypto/sha/sha.h index 7cbca26..c5dd660 100644 --- a/crypto/sha/sha.h +++ b/crypto/sha/sha.h @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ extern "C" { #error SHA is disabled. #endif -/* +/*- * !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! * ! SHA_LONG has to be at least 32 bits wide. If it's wider, then ! * ! SHA_LONG_LOG2 has to be defined along. ! diff --git a/crypto/sha/sha512.c b/crypto/sha/sha512.c index 080b33e..5be98d3 100644 --- a/crypto/sha/sha512.c +++ b/crypto/sha/sha512.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ */ #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) -/* +/*- * IMPLEMENTATION NOTES. * * As you might have noticed 32-bit hash algorithms: diff --git a/crypto/stack/safestack.h b/crypto/stack/safestack.h index 5327cb8..99393cb 100644 --- a/crypto/stack/safestack.h +++ b/crypto/stack/safestack.h @@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ STACK_OF(type) \ #define IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(type) /* nada (obsolete in new safestack approach)*/ -/* Strings are special: normally an lhash entry will point to a single +/*- + * Strings are special: normally an lhash entry will point to a single * (somewhat) mutable object. In the case of strings: * * a) Instead of a single char, there is an array of chars, NUL-terminated. @@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ STACK_OF(type) \ * So, they need their own declarations. Especially important for * type-checking tools, such as Deputy. * -o * In practice, however, it appears to be hard to have a const + * In practice, however, it appears to be hard to have a const * string. For now, I'm settling for dealing with the fact it is a * string at all. */ diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts.h b/crypto/ts/ts.h index c2448e3..b5fe7ae 100644 --- a/crypto/ts/ts.h +++ b/crypto/ts/ts.h @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ extern "C" { #include <openssl/x509.h> #include <openssl/x509v3.h> -/* +/*- MessageImprint ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, hashedMessage OCTET STRING } @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ typedef struct TS_msg_imprint_st ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hashed_msg; } TS_MSG_IMPRINT; -/* +/*- TimeStampReq ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(1) }, messageImprint MessageImprint, @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ typedef struct TS_req_st STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* [0] OPTIONAL */ } TS_REQ; -/* +/*- Accuracy ::= SEQUENCE { seconds INTEGER OPTIONAL, millis [0] INTEGER (1..999) OPTIONAL, @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ typedef struct TS_accuracy_st ASN1_INTEGER *micros; } TS_ACCURACY; -/* +/*- TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(1) }, policy TSAPolicyId, @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ typedef struct TS_tst_info_st STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; } TS_TST_INFO; -/* +/*- PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ typedef struct TS_status_info_st DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) -/* +/*- TimeStampResp ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatusInfo, timeStampToken TimeStampToken OPTIONAL } @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ typedef struct TS_resp_st /* The structure below would belong to the ESS component. */ -/* +/*- IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE { issuer GeneralNames, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ typedef struct ESS_issuer_serial ASN1_INTEGER *serial; } ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL; -/* +/*- ESSCertID ::= SEQUENCE { certHash Hash, issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ typedef struct ESS_cert_id DECLARE_STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) -/* +/*- SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { certs SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID, policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx); void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx); void TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx); -/* +/*- * If ctx is NULL, it allocates and returns a new object, otherwise * it returns ctx. It initialises all the members as follows: * flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE) diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c index 3c7f816..cee1398 100644 --- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c +++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ int TS_RESP_verify_token(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *token) return ret; } -/* +/*- * Verifies whether the 'token' contains a valid time stamp token * with regards to the settings of the context. Only those checks are * carried out that are specified in the context: diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui.h b/crypto/ui/ui.h index 5c4ff49..f23ae16 100644 --- a/crypto/ui/ui.h +++ b/crypto/ui/ui.h @@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ UI *UI_new(void); UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method); void UI_free(UI *ui); -/* The following functions are used to add strings to be printed and prompt +/*- + The following functions are used to add strings to be printed and prompt strings to prompt for data. The names are UI_{add,dup}_<function>_string and UI_{add,dup}_input_boolean. @@ -243,7 +244,8 @@ UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void); /* ---------- For method writers ---------- */ -/* A method contains a number of functions that implement the low level +/*- + A method contains a number of functions that implement the low level of the User Interface. The functions are: an opener This function starts a session, maybe by opening diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c b/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c index ee5c5c1..1b782e2 100644 --- a/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c +++ b/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c,const void *_inp,size_t bits) else /* bit-oriented loop */ #endif { - /* + /*- inp | +-------+-------+------- diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509.h b/crypto/x509/x509.h index ad804f2..46c1d44 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509.h +++ b/crypto/x509/x509.h @@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ typedef struct Netscape_certificate_sequence STACK_OF(X509) *certs; } NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE; -/* Unused (and iv length is wrong) +/*- Unused (and iv length is wrong) typedef struct CBCParameter_st { unsigned char iv[8]; diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c index 79281c6..47426c7 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c @@ -624,7 +624,8 @@ X509_OBJECT *X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match(STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *h, X509_OBJECT *x } -/* Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations +/*- + * Try to get issuer certificate from store. Due to limitations * of the API this can only retrieve a single certificate matching * a given subject name. However it will fill the cache with all * matching certificates, so we can examine the cache for all diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h index 8a6f10d..aff2b0c 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ typedef struct x509_file_st } X509_CERT_FILE_CTX; /*******************************/ -/* +/*- SSL_CTX -> X509_STORE -> X509_LOOKUP ->X509_LOOKUP_METHOD diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c index a809219..92ac038 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c @@ -193,7 +193,8 @@ void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) OPENSSL_free(param); } -/* This function determines how parameters are "inherited" from one structure +/*- + * This function determines how parameters are "inherited" from one structure * to another. There are several different ways this can happen. * * 1. If a child structure needs to have its values initialized from a parent diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509name.c b/crypto/x509/x509name.c index 27bc4dc..81f40f5 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509name.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509name.c @@ -157,14 +157,16 @@ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc) set_prev=ret->set-1; set_next=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk,loc)->set; - /* set_prev is the previous set + /*- + * set_prev is the previous set * set is the current set * set_next is the following * prev 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * set 1 1 2 2 * next 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 * so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then - * re-number down by 1 */ + * re-number down by 1 + */ if (set_prev+1 < set_next) for (i=loc; i<n; i++) sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk,i)->set--; diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c index 93470c3..361bc32 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c @@ -758,7 +758,8 @@ void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) } -/* Application policy checking function. +/*- + * Application policy checking function. * Return codes: * 0 Internal Error. * 1 Successful. diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c index 26a6f67..06520fe 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c @@ -225,7 +225,8 @@ static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip) return 1; } -/* Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints. +/*- + * Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints. * Return values: * X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed. * X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation. @@ -234,7 +235,6 @@ static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip) * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name - */ int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c index 5f931db..8e0a685 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c @@ -497,7 +497,8 @@ static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; } -/* CA checks common to all purposes +/*- + * CA checks common to all purposes * return codes: * 0 not a CA * 1 is a CA @@ -700,7 +701,8 @@ static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) return 1; } -/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. +/*- + * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by * subject name. diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c index 3bf1579..5367271 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ static STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, sct->version = *p2++; if (sct->version == 0) /* SCT v1 */ { - /* Fixed-length header: + /*- + * Fixed-length header: * struct { * (1 byte) Version sct_version; * (32 bytes) LogID id; @@ -251,7 +252,8 @@ static STACK_OF(SCT) *d2i_SCT_LIST(STACK_OF(SCT) **a, const unsigned char **pp, p2 += fieldlen; sctlen -= fieldlen; - /* digitally-signed struct header: + /*- + * digitally-signed struct header: * (1 byte) Hash algorithm * (1 byte) Signature algorithm * (2 bytes + ?) Signature diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c index dd5f9f8..fbf82d0 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static int set_cn(X509 *crt, ...) return ret; } -/* +/*- int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); |