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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/ct/ct_sct.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/ct/ct_sct.c33
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c b/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
index 9eefa0c..1fc7456 100644
--- a/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
+++ b/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
@@ -334,17 +334,22 @@ int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
const CTLOG *log;
+ /*
+ * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
+ * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0).
+ */
if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
- goto end;
+ return 0;
}
log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
+ /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
if (log == NULL) {
sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
- goto end;
+ return 0;
}
sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
@@ -372,10 +377,28 @@ int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
goto err;
}
+ /*
+ * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy
+ * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
+ * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
+ * processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps
+ * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
+ *
+ * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
+ * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
+ * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
+ * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
+ * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
+ * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
+ * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
+ * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
+ * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
+ * application decide what to do.
+ */
if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
- goto err;
-
- sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+ else
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
end: