diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 19 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 3438692..f16be8a 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -1501,10 +1501,29 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ret; + if (ctx->parent) return 1; + /* + * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a + * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor + * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 + * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the + * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look + * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain + * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it + * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the + * X509_policy_check() call. + */ + if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { + X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); + if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) + sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); + if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; |