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-rw-r--r--apps/ts.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_err.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/evp_lib.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/m_sigver.c15
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c6
-rw-r--r--crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa.h1
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c19
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c16
-rw-r--r--crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c5
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_enc.c8
-rw-r--r--ssl/d1_pkt.c14
-rw-r--r--ssl/s2_lib.c11
-rw-r--r--ssl/s2_pkt.c14
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_enc.c21
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_pkt.c10
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_srvr.c11
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_ciph.c3
-rw-r--r--ssl/ssl_locl.h2
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_enc.c20
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c5
28 files changed, 168 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/apps/ts.c b/apps/ts.c
index 08b8c4a..74e7e93 100644
--- a/apps/ts.c
+++ b/apps/ts.c
@@ -598,6 +598,8 @@ static int create_digest(BIO *input, char *digest, const EVP_MD *md,
int md_value_len;
md_value_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (md_value_len < 0)
+ goto err;
if (input)
{
/* Digest must be computed from an input file. */
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp.h b/crypto/evp/evp.h
index 985ff2f..df54409 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp.h
@@ -1183,6 +1183,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
#define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 128
#define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX 127
#define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 110
+#define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE 162
#define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT 102
#define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD 115
#define EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE 160
@@ -1262,6 +1263,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
#define EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION 148
#define EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE 102
#define EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE 120
+#define EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL 159
#define EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED 144
#define EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS 103
#define EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET 131
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
index 25a8ad7..04485f0 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/evp/evp_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
+{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_SIZE"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD), "EVP_PBE_alg_add"},
{ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE), "EVP_PBE_alg_add_type"},
@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION) ,"invalid operation"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE) ,"iv too large"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_KEYGEN_FAILURE) ,"keygen failure"},
+{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL),"message digest is null"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED) ,"method not supported"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS) ,"missing parameters"},
{ERR_REASON(EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET) ,"no cipher set"},
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
index daccb66..d815bc6 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
@@ -256,7 +256,10 @@ int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md)
int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md)
{
if (!md)
+ {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL);
return -1;
+ }
return md->md_size;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
index c6d257f..d98455e 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
@@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
return do_sigver_init(ctx, pctx, type, e, pkey, 1);
}
-
int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen)
{
int sctx, r = 0;
@@ -159,13 +158,15 @@ int EVP_DigestSignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, size_t *siglen)
{
if (sctx)
{
- if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx,
- sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0)
+ if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, ctx) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int s = EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest);
+ if (s < 0 || EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL, s) <= 0)
return 0;
}
- else if (EVP_PKEY_sign(ctx->pctx, sigret, siglen, NULL,
- EVP_MD_size(ctx->digest)) <= 0)
- return 0;
}
return 1;
}
@@ -177,6 +178,8 @@ int EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
int r;
unsigned int mdlen;
int vctx;
+
+ /* FIXME: surely this should test verifyctx? (Ben 29/12/08) */
if (ctx->pctx->pmeth->signctx)
vctx = 1;
else
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
index 9c6e07b..7ecfa8d 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
int saltlen, iter;
unsigned char *salt;
const unsigned char *pbuf;
+ int mdsize;
/* Extract useful info from parameter */
if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
@@ -109,9 +110,12 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, saltlen);
PBEPARAM_free(pbe);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
+ mdsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (mdsize < 0)
+ return 0;
for (i = 1; i < iter; i++) {
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_tmp, EVP_MD_size(md));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_tmp, mdsize);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL);
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
index 70fd48a..334379f 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
HMAC_CTX hctx;
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ return 0;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
p = out;
@@ -273,8 +275,9 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data;
saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length;
iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter);
- PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
- keylen, key);
+ if(!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd,
+ keylen, key))
+ goto err;
EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de);
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
diff --git a/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c b/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
index aff7013..985921c 100644
--- a/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
+++ b/crypto/hmac/hm_pmeth.c
@@ -157,7 +157,11 @@ static int hmac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
{
unsigned int hlen;
HMAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx->data;
- *siglen = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx);
+ int l = EVP_MD_CTX_size(mctx);
+
+ if (l < 0)
+ return 0;
+ *siglen = l;
if (!sig)
return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
index be9bf5b..415d67e 100644
--- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c
@@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
}
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ return -1;
if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
(cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
index 9e57eee..b72cf16 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_key.c
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
int ret;
unsigned char *unipass;
int uniplen;
+
if(!pass) {
unipass = NULL;
uniplen = 0;
@@ -90,6 +91,8 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_asc(const char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
}
ret = PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unipass, uniplen, salt, saltlen,
id, iter, n, out, md_type);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
if(unipass) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(unipass, uniplen); /* Clear password from memory */
OPENSSL_free(unipass);
@@ -129,6 +132,8 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
#endif
v = EVP_MD_block_size (md_type);
u = EVP_MD_size (md_type);
+ if (u < 0)
+ return 0;
D = OPENSSL_malloc (v);
Ai = OPENSSL_malloc (u);
B = OPENSSL_malloc (v + 1);
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
index 70bfef6..9ab740d 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
HMAC_CTX hmac;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
int saltlen, iter;
+ int md_size;
if (!PKCS7_type_is_data(p12->authsafes))
{
@@ -87,13 +88,16 @@ int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC,PKCS12_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
+ md_size = EVP_MD_size(md_type);
+ if (md_size < 0)
+ return 0;
if(!PKCS12_key_gen (pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID, iter,
- EVP_MD_size(md_type), key, md_type)) {
+ md_size, key, md_type)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC,PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
return 0;
}
HMAC_CTX_init(&hmac);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, EVP_MD_size(md_type), md_type, NULL);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL);
HMAC_Update(&hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
p12->authsafes->d.data->length);
HMAC_Final(&hmac, mac, maclen);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 91cd419..cf74343 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -448,7 +448,6 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
/* Reason codes. */
#define RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH 100
-#define RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT 149
#define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE 101
#define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT 102
#define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT 103
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index a53c5f6..cf9f110 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[]=
static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
{
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH) ,"algorithm mismatch"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT) ,"bad argument"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE) ,"bad e value"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT),"bad fixed header decrypt"},
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT) ,"bad pad byte count"},
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
index 3652677..70bacf8 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen);
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
@@ -76,11 +76,13 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
20);
#endif
- MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ return 0;
for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
db[i] ^= dbmask[i];
- MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) < 0)
+ return 0;
for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
seed[i] ^= seedmask[i];
@@ -133,11 +135,13 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
maskeddb = padded_from + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen);
+ if (MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen))
+ return -1;
for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
seed[i] ^= padded_from[i];
- MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return -1;
for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++)
db[i] ^= maskeddb[i];
@@ -188,6 +192,8 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if (mdlen < 0)
+ return -1;
for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++)
{
cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255);
@@ -213,7 +219,8 @@ int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
return 0;
}
-int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen)
+static int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed,
+ long seedlen)
{
return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1());
}
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
index 2e44194..775c361 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -81,13 +81,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- if (Hash == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_R_BAD_ARGUMENT);
- goto err;
- }
-
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+ if (hLen < 0)
+ goto err;
/*
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
@@ -132,7 +128,8 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash);
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(DB, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash) < 0)
+ goto err;
for (i = 0; i < maskedDBLen; i++)
DB[i] ^= EM[i];
if (MSBits)
@@ -183,6 +180,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
+ if (hLen < 0)
+ goto err;
/*
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
@@ -238,7 +237,8 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
/* Generate dbMask in place then perform XOR on it */
- PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash);
+ if (PKCS1_MGF1(EM, maskedDBLen, H, hLen, Hash))
+ goto err;
p = EM;
diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index 6acacac..e1f3b53 100644
--- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -604,7 +604,10 @@ static int TS_compute_imprint(BIO *data, TS_TST_INFO *tst_info,
}
/* Compute message digest. */
- *imprint_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ length = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (length < 0)
+ goto err;
+ *imprint_len = length;
if (!(*imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(*imprint_len)))
{
TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index ea5e12e..9de787e 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -135,7 +135,11 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
if (send)
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+ {
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
@@ -157,7 +161,11 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
else
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+ {
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index daf1fee..dea63d6 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -428,7 +428,10 @@ printf("\n");
if (!clear)
{
/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
- mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ int t;
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ mac_size=t;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
{
@@ -453,7 +456,7 @@ printf("\n");
}
rr->length-=mac_size;
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
- if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+ if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
{
goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
}
@@ -1341,7 +1344,11 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
if (clear)
mac_size=0;
else
+ {
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
/* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
#if 0
@@ -1428,7 +1435,8 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
if (mac_size != 0)
{
- s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
+ if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
}
diff --git a/ssl/s2_lib.c b/ssl/s2_lib.c
index 4cfafce..907e305 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_lib.c
@@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
unsigned char *km;
unsigned char c='0';
const EVP_MD *md5;
+ int md_size;
md5 = EVP_md5();
@@ -471,10 +472,12 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
-
- for (i=0; i<s->s2->key_material_length; i += EVP_MD_size(md5))
+ md_size = EVP_MD_size(md5);
+ if (md_size < 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i=0; i<s->s2->key_material_length; i += md_size)
{
- if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + EVP_MD_size(md5)) >
+ if (((km - s->s2->key_material) + md_size) >
(int)sizeof(s->s2->key_material))
{
/* EVP_DigestFinal_ex() below would write beyond buffer */
@@ -493,7 +496,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->conn_id,s->s2->conn_id_length);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,km,NULL);
- km += EVP_MD_size(md5);
+ km += md_size;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
diff --git a/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index e6d5d09..9c1d131 100644
--- a/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
#define USE_SOCKETS
static int read_n(SSL *s,unsigned int n,unsigned int max,unsigned int extend);
-static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len);
+static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len);
static int write_pending(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len);
static int ssl_mt_error(int n);
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
unsigned char mac[MAX_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char *p;
int i;
- unsigned int mac_size;
+ int mac_size;
ssl2_read_again:
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
else
{
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ return -1;
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= MAX_MAC_SIZE);
s->s2->mac_data=p;
s->s2->ract_data= &p[mac_size];
@@ -447,7 +449,7 @@ int ssl2_write(SSL *s, const void *_buf, int len)
n=(len-tot);
for (;;)
{
- i=do_ssl_write(s,&(buf[tot]),n);
+ i=n_do_ssl_write(s,&(buf[tot]),n);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->s2->wnum=tot;
@@ -511,7 +513,7 @@ static int write_pending(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
}
}
-static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int j,k,olen,p,mac_size,bs;
register unsigned char *pp;
@@ -529,7 +531,11 @@ static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
if (s->s2->clear_text)
mac_size=0;
else
+ {
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
/* lets set the pad p */
if (s->s2->clear_text)
diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 96e59f6..00fad17 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -315,6 +315,8 @@ int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
i=EVP_MD_size(m);
+ if (i < 0)
+ goto err2;
cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
j=is_exp ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
@@ -409,7 +411,11 @@ int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
#endif
- num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+EVP_MD_size(hash)+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+ num=EVP_MD_size(hash);
+ if (num < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+num+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
num*=2;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
@@ -666,6 +672,9 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(&ctx);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return 0;
+
npad=(48/n)*n;
if (sender != NULL)
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,sender,len);
@@ -686,7 +695,7 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
return((int)ret);
}
-int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
@@ -695,6 +704,7 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
unsigned char *p,rec_char;
unsigned int md_size;
int npad;
+ int t;
if (send)
{
@@ -711,9 +721,10 @@ int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
hash=ssl->read_hash;
}
- /* If hash is NULL, then a crash will follow anyway */
- OPENSSL_assert(hash);
- md_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ if (t < 0)
+ return -1;
+ md_size=t;
npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 54c0540..727827f 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -2077,7 +2077,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data={
ssl3_enc,
- ssl3_mac,
+ n_ssl3_mac,
ssl3_setup_key_block,
ssl3_generate_master_secret,
ssl3_change_cipher_state,
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 330918a..e6c68b3 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ printf("\n");
{
/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
{
@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ printf("\n");
#endif
}
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
- if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
{
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
@@ -649,7 +650,11 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
if (clear)
mac_size=0;
else
+ {
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
@@ -747,7 +752,8 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
if (mac_size != 0)
{
- s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
wr->input=p;
wr->data=p;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 5cc3a19..d732764 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
int offset=0;
int dgst_num;
+
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
@@ -536,8 +537,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
{
+ int dgst_size;
+
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
- offset+=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ if (dgst_size < 0)
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ offset+=dgst_size;
}
}
break;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 02cf181..8858dcb 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -381,16 +381,19 @@ void ssl_load_ciphers(void)
EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_md5);
ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]=
EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] >= 0);
ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_sha1);
ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]=
EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] >= 0);
ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_GostR3411_94);
if (ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX])
{
ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]=
EVP_MD_size(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX]);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX] >= 0);
}
ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]=
EVP_get_digestbyname(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
index 9df4be5..2e6e98f 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ int ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen,unsigned char *p)
int ssl3_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *p);
void ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len);
int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send_data);
-int ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data);
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send_data);
void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s);
unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x);
SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 4d9a18e..ea3cd71 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
unsigned int A1_len;
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
@@ -605,7 +606,10 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
if (send)
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+ {
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
@@ -616,7 +620,10 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
else
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+ {
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
@@ -796,8 +803,8 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
{
if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
{
- unsigned int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (hashsize > (sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+ int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
{
/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
err = 1;
@@ -835,6 +842,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char buf[5];
int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+ int t;
if (send)
{
@@ -851,7 +859,9 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
hash=ssl->read_hash;
}
- md_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ md_size=t;
buf[0]=rec->type;
buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
@@ -884,7 +894,9 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
- EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+ t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+
if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("sec=");
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index e6ba33d..c1d4173 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1532,6 +1532,11 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
* integrity checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ if (mlen < 0)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
generated by cgit v1.1 at 2024-07-14 06:16:26 +0000