diff options
author | Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 2016-04-14 23:59:26 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 2016-04-15 13:21:43 -0400 |
commit | f0e0fd51fd8307f6eae64862ad9aaea113f1177a (patch) | |
tree | b00de87cb2fd4dc437de5994d3c8028dd9262460 /crypto | |
parent | 34da11b39d2421f546ec568f355875eec353844c (diff) | |
download | openssl-f0e0fd51fd8307f6eae64862ad9aaea113f1177a.zip openssl-f0e0fd51fd8307f6eae64862ad9aaea113f1177a.tar.gz openssl-f0e0fd51fd8307f6eae64862ad9aaea113f1177a.tar.bz2 |
Make many X509_xxx types opaque.
Make X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP,
and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD opaque.
Remove unused X509_CERT_FILE_CTX
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/cms/cms_smime.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h | 82 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c | 82 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/by_file.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_err.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h | 65 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_lu.c | 33 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 44 |
10 files changed, 311 insertions, 67 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c index e84b7e7..98054b3 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c @@ -273,21 +273,26 @@ static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); X509 *signer; int i, j, r = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL); - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, certs)) { + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, certs)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR); goto err; } - X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, "smime_sign"); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, "smime_sign"); if (crls) - X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&ctx, crls); + X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx, crls); - i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); + i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); if (i <= 0) { - j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx); + j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", @@ -296,7 +301,7 @@ static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si, } r = 1; err: - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return r; } diff --git a/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h b/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h index fc032ae..ee49f2a 100644 --- a/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h +++ b/crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h @@ -217,6 +217,77 @@ struct x509_st { CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; } /* X509 */ ; +/* + * This is a used when verifying cert chains. Since the gathering of the + * cert chain can take some time (and have to be 'retried', this needs to be + * kept and passed around. + */ +struct x509_store_ctx_st { /* X509_STORE_CTX */ + X509_STORE *ctx; + /* used when looking up certs */ + int current_method; + /* The following are set by the caller */ + /* The cert to check */ + X509 *cert; + /* chain of X509s - untrusted - passed in */ + STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted; + /* set of CRLs passed in */ + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; + /* Other info for use with get_issuer() */ + void *other_ctx; + /* Callbacks for various operations */ + /* called to verify a certificate */ + int (*verify) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + /* error callback */ + int (*verify_cb) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + /* get issuers cert from ctx */ + int (*get_issuer) (X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); + /* check issued */ + int (*check_issued) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); + /* Check revocation status of chain */ + int (*check_revocation) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + /* retrieve CRL */ + int (*get_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x); + /* Check CRL validity */ + int (*check_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl); + /* Check certificate against CRL */ + int (*cert_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); + int (*check_policy) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + STACK_OF(X509) *(*lookup_certs) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*lookup_crls) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); + int (*cleanup) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + /* The following is built up */ + /* if 0, rebuild chain */ + int valid; + /* number of untrusted certs */ + int num_untrusted; + /* chain of X509s - built up and trusted */ + STACK_OF(X509) *chain; + /* Valid policy tree */ + X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; + /* Require explicit policy value */ + int explicit_policy; + /* When something goes wrong, this is why */ + int error_depth; + int error; + X509 *current_cert; + /* cert currently being tested as valid issuer */ + X509 *current_issuer; + /* current CRL */ + X509_CRL *current_crl; + /* score of current CRL */ + int current_crl_score; + /* Reason mask */ + unsigned int current_reasons; + /* For CRL path validation: parent context */ + X509_STORE_CTX *parent; + CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; + SSL_DANE *dane; + /* signed via bare TA public key, rather than CA certificate */ + int bare_ta_signed; +}; + /* PKCS#8 private key info structure */ struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st { @@ -230,3 +301,14 @@ struct X509_sig_st { X509_ALGOR *algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest; }; + +struct x509_object_st { + /* one of the above types */ + X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type; + union { + char *ptr; + X509 *x509; + X509_CRL *crl; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + } data; +}; diff --git a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c index 356c797..aba623c 100644 --- a/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c @@ -82,13 +82,18 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509 *signer, *x; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags); if (!ret) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); - goto end; + goto err; + } + ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; @@ -99,7 +104,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0); if (!skey || ret <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); - goto end; + goto err; } } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { @@ -111,30 +116,28 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto end; + goto err; } } } else { untrusted = bs->certs; } - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted); + init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted); if (!init_res) { - ret = -1; OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - goto end; + goto err; } - X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); - ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); - chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); + ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); if (ret <= 0) { - i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx); + i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); - goto end; + goto err; } if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) { ret = 1; @@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */ if (ret != 0) - goto end; + goto err; /* * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit @@ -160,12 +163,16 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED); - goto end; + goto err; } ret = 1; + goto end; } + err: + ret = 0; end: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); if (bs->certs && certs) sk_X509_free(untrusted); @@ -367,24 +374,30 @@ int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509 *signer; X509_NAME *nm; GENERAL_NAME *gen; - int ret; - X509_STORE_CTX ctx; + int ret = 0; + X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + + if (ctx == NULL) { + OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!req->optionalSignature) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED); - return 0; + goto err; } gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName; if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE); - return 0; + goto err; } nm = gen->d.directoryName; ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags); if (ret <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND); - return 0; + goto err; } if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER)) flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY; @@ -394,35 +407,42 @@ int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey); if (ret <= 0) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); - return 0; + goto err; } } if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) { int init_res; if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL); + init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL); else - init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, + init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, req->optionalSignature->certs); if (!init_res) { OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - return 0; + goto err; } - X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); - X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST); - ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST); + ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx); if (ret <= 0) { - ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx); + ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret)); - return 0; + goto err; } } - return 1; + ret = 1; + goto end; + +err: + ret = 0; +end: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; + } static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c index 8027640..b146f68 100644 --- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c +++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, X509 *signer; STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sinfos; PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si; - X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx = NULL; char *buf = NULL; int i, j = 0, k, ret = 0; BIO *p7bio = NULL; @@ -306,26 +306,28 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, /* Now verify the certificates */ + cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (cert_ctx == NULL) + goto err; if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOVERIFY)) for (k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(signers); k++) { signer = sk_X509_value(signers, k); if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCHAIN)) { - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, p7->d.sign->cert)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } - X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&cert_ctx, "smime_sign"); - } else if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(cert_ctx, "smime_sign"); + } else if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, NULL)) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } if (!(flags & PKCS7_NOCRL)) - X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&cert_ctx, p7->d.sign->crl); - i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx); + X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(cert_ctx, p7->d.sign->crl); + i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) - j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx); - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx); + j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) { PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_VERIFY, PKCS7_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); @@ -404,6 +406,7 @@ int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, ret = 1; err: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx); OPENSSL_free(buf); if (tmpin == indata) { if (indata) diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c index e6e213a..89b86e1 100644 --- a/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c +++ b/crypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c @@ -211,27 +211,36 @@ int TS_RESP_verify_signature(PKCS7 *token, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain) { - X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx; + X509_STORE_CTX *cert_ctx = NULL; int i; - int ret = 1; + int ret = 0; *chain = NULL; - if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted)) - return 0; - X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN); - i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx); + cert_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + if (cert_ctx == NULL) { + TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted)) + goto end; + X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN); + i = X509_verify_cert(cert_ctx); if (i <= 0) { - int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&cert_ctx); + int j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(cert_ctx); TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CERT, TS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(j)); - ret = 0; - } else { - *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx); + goto err; } + *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(cert_ctx); + ret = 1; + goto end; - X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_ctx); +err: + ret = 0; +end: + X509_STORE_CTX_free(cert_ctx); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/x509/by_file.c b/crypto/x509/by_file.c index 51d642d..eea7a7e 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/by_file.c +++ b/crypto/x509/by_file.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/x509.h> #include <openssl/pem.h> +#include "x509_lcl.h" static int by_file_ctrl(X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, char **ret); diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c index 90a22de..d140d52 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_err.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_err.c @@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = { {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW), "X509_STORE_CTX_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT), "X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit"}, + {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_STORE_GET_X509_BY_SUBJECT), + "X509_STORE_get_X509_by_subject"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ), "X509_to_X509_REQ"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD), "X509_TRUST_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET), "X509_TRUST_set"}, diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h b/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h index 603c177..db98a10 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lcl.h @@ -115,6 +115,71 @@ struct x509_crl_method_st { int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk); }; +struct x509_lookup_method_st { + const char *name; + int (*new_item) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); + void (*free) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); + int (*init) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); + int (*shutdown) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx); + int (*ctrl) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int cmd, const char *argc, long argl, + char **ret); + int (*get_by_subject) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name, + X509_OBJECT *ret); + int (*get_by_issuer_serial) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, X509_NAME *name, + ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_OBJECT *ret); + int (*get_by_fingerprint) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, + unsigned char *bytes, int len, + X509_OBJECT *ret); + int (*get_by_alias) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx, int type, char *str, int len, + X509_OBJECT *ret); +}; + +/* This is the functions plus an instance of the local variables. */ +struct x509_lookup_st { + int init; /* have we been started */ + int skip; /* don't use us. */ + X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method; /* the functions */ + char *method_data; /* method data */ + X509_STORE *store_ctx; /* who owns us */ +}; + +/* + * This is used to hold everything. It is used for all certificate + * validation. Once we have a certificate chain, the 'verify' function is + * then called to actually check the cert chain. + */ +struct x509_store_st { + /* The following is a cache of trusted certs */ + int cache; /* if true, stash any hits */ + STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT) *objs; /* Cache of all objects */ + /* These are external lookup methods */ + STACK_OF(X509_LOOKUP) *get_cert_methods; + X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; + /* Callbacks for various operations */ + /* called to verify a certificate */ + int (*verify) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + /* error callback */ + int (*verify_cb) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + /* get issuers cert from ctx */ + int (*get_issuer) (X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); + /* check issued */ + int (*check_issued) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); + /* Check revocation status of chain */ + int (*check_revocation) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + /* retrieve CRL */ + int (*get_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x); + /* Check CRL validity */ + int (*check_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl); + /* Check certificate against CRL */ + int (*cert_crl) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); + STACK_OF(X509) *(*lookup_certs) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *(*lookup_crls) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm); + int (*cleanup) (X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); + CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; + int references; + CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; +}; + typedef struct lookup_dir_hashes_st BY_DIR_HASH; typedef struct lookup_dir_entry_st BY_DIR_ENTRY; DEFINE_STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c index f9802c5..b822966 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c @@ -294,6 +294,23 @@ X509_LOOKUP *X509_STORE_add_lookup(X509_STORE *v, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *m) } } +X509_OBJECT *X509_STORE_get_X509_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, + X509_NAME *name) +{ + X509_OBJECT *ret; + + ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (*ret)); + if (ret == NULL) { + X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_GET_X509_BY_SUBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + if (!X509_STORE_get_by_subject(vs, type, name, ret)) { + OPENSSL_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type, X509_NAME *name, X509_OBJECT *ret) { @@ -414,9 +431,22 @@ void X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(X509_OBJECT *a) } } +X509 *X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(X509_OBJECT *a) +{ + return a->data.x509; +} + +void X509_OBJECT_free(X509_OBJECT *a) +{ + if (a == NULL) + return; + X509_OBJECT_free_contents(a); + OPENSSL_free(a); +} + void X509_OBJECT_free_contents(X509_OBJECT *a) { - if (!a) + if (a == NULL) return; switch (a->type) { default: @@ -613,6 +643,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) X509_NAME *xn; X509_OBJECT obj, *pobj; int i, ok, idx, ret; + *issuer = NULL; xn = X509_get_issuer_name(x); ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_X509, xn, &obj); diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 2c3efdd..312b112 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -1994,7 +1994,7 @@ X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) return ctx->current_cert; } -STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->chain; } @@ -2026,11 +2026,6 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) ctx->cert = x; } -void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) -{ - ctx->untrusted = sk; -} - void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) { ctx->crls = sk; @@ -2278,8 +2273,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. */ - -void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) +void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->other_ctx = sk; ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; @@ -2329,11 +2323,43 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) + X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } +X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->verify_cb; +} + +X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->cert; +} + +STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->untrusted; +} + +void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) +{ + sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); + ctx->chain = sk; +} + +void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, + X509_STORE_CTX_verify verify) +{ + ctx->verify = verify; +} + +X509_STORE_CTX_verify X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->verify; +} + X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->tree; |