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| author | Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org> | 2008-08-06 15:54:15 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org> | 2008-08-06 15:54:15 +0000 |
| commit | 4c3296960de32e5abfbb8f4703a2ce624d82669f (patch) | |
| tree | f603740bcbf0e3cde6008cead9586e5b4edbdc5b /crypto/rand/md_rand.c | |
| parent | 96826bfc84c63207b720543443626029946a0fc7 (diff) | |
| download | openssl-4c3296960de32e5abfbb8f4703a2ce624d82669f.zip openssl-4c3296960de32e5abfbb8f4703a2ce624d82669f.tar.gz openssl-4c3296960de32e5abfbb8f4703a2ce624d82669f.tar.bz2 | |
Remove the dual-callback scheme for numeric and pointer thread IDs,
deprecate the original (numeric-only) scheme, and replace with the
CRYPTO_THREADID object. This hides the platform-specifics and should reduce
the possibility for programming errors (where failing to explicitly check
both thread ID forms could create subtle, platform-specific bugs).
Thanks to Bodo, for invaluable review and feedback.
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rand/md_rand.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/rand/md_rand.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c index cfc7877..810b4c2 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c @@ -145,8 +145,7 @@ static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND * (to prevent double locking) */ /* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ -static unsigned long locking_thread_id = 0; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ -static void *locking_thread_idptr = NULL; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ +static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ #ifdef PREDICT @@ -214,8 +213,10 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) /* check if we already have the lock */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread_id == CRYPTO_thread_id()) && (locking_thread_idptr == CRYPTO_thread_idptr()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -373,8 +374,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread_id = CRYPTO_thread_id(); - locking_thread_idptr = CRYPTO_thread_idptr(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; @@ -529,15 +529,17 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) static int ssleay_rand_status(void) { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; int ret; int do_not_lock; + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); /* check if we already have the lock * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ if (crypto_lock_rand) { CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - do_not_lock = (locking_thread_id == CRYPTO_thread_id()) && (locking_thread_idptr == CRYPTO_thread_idptr()); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); } else @@ -549,8 +551,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void) /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); - locking_thread_id = CRYPTO_thread_id(); - locking_thread_idptr = CRYPTO_thread_idptr(); + CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); crypto_lock_rand = 1; } |