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authorDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>1999-09-18 22:37:44 +0000
committerDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>1999-09-18 22:37:44 +0000
commit1c80019a2c8f59410552197723829fd72ab45a5e (patch)
treee78f00fb8637de56d6dc390c9d5a239b494ab830
parent090d848ea89b112587cf2e5b26acfaaae6bf79c2 (diff)
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Add new sign and verify members to RSA_METHOD and change SSL code to use sign
and verify rather than direct encrypt/decrypt.
-rw-r--r--CHANGES11
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa.h17
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c153
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_clnt.c16
-rw-r--r--ssl/s3_srvr.c13
6 files changed, 135 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 7b9cf1c..6deb18f 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@
Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [xx XXX 1999]
+ *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign
+ and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions
+ will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful
+ if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available.
+ For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt()
+ should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead.
+ This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1
+ for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead
+ of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt().
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these
will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a
similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 6c64db7..7fe1d23 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -91,6 +91,18 @@ typedef struct rsa_meth_st
int (*finish)(RSA *rsa); /* called at free */
int flags; /* RSA_METHOD_FLAG_* things */
char *app_data; /* may be needed! */
+/* New sign and verify functions: some libraries don't allow arbitrary data
+ * to be signed/verified: this allows them to be used. Note: for this to work
+ * the RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *NOT* be used
+ * RSA_sign(), RSA_verify() should be used instead. Note: for backwards
+ * compatability this functionality is only enabled if the RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER
+ * option is set in 'flags'.
+ */
+ int (*rsa_sign)(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
+ int (*rsa_verify)(int dtype, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
+
} RSA_METHOD;
struct rsa_st
@@ -140,6 +152,10 @@ struct rsa_st
*/
#define RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY 0x20
+/* This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, rsa_verify functions.
+ */
+#define RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER 0x40
+
#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
#define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
@@ -299,6 +315,7 @@ char *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx);
#define RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 124
#define RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D 125
#define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 123
+#define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 131
#define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q 126
#define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 120
#define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING 113
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index 7762bd5..5cfbea2 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
{RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D ,"dmp1 not congruent to d"},
{RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D ,"dmq1 not congruent to d"},
{RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 ,"d e not congruent to 1"},
+{RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH ,"invalid message length"},
{RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q ,"iqmp not inverse of q"},
{RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL ,"key size too small"},
{RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING ,"null before block missing"},
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 1740494..15c6d1a 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -63,59 +63,77 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
+
int RSA_sign(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
X509_SIG sig;
ASN1_TYPE parameter;
int i,j,ret=1;
- unsigned char *p,*s;
+ unsigned char *p,*s = NULL;
X509_ALGOR algor;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
-
- sig.algor= &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm=OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- return(0);
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
- return(0);
+ if(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
+ if(type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if(m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return(0);
}
- parameter.type=V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr=NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter= &parameter;
+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ s = m;
+ } else {
+ sig.algor= &algor;
+ sig.algor->algorithm=OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ parameter.type=V_ASN1_NULL;
+ parameter.value.ptr=NULL;
+ sig.algor->parameter= &parameter;
- sig.digest= &digest;
- sig.digest->data=m;
- sig.digest->length=m_len;
+ sig.digest= &digest;
+ sig.digest->data=m;
+ sig.digest->length=m_len;
- i=i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,NULL);
+ i=i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,NULL);
+ }
j=RSA_size(rsa);
if ((i-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
return(0);
}
- s=(unsigned char *)Malloc((unsigned int)j+1);
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- p=s;
- i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,&p);
+ if(type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ s=(unsigned char *)Malloc((unsigned int)j+1);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ p=s;
+ i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,&p);
+ }
i=RSA_private_encrypt(i,s,sigret,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (i <= 0)
ret=0;
else
*siglen=i;
- memset(s,0,(unsigned int)j+1);
- Free(s);
+ if(type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ memset(s,0,(unsigned int)j+1);
+ Free(s);
+ }
return(ret);
}
@@ -132,53 +150,68 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
return(0);
}
+ if(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+
s=(unsigned char *)Malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
if (s == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
+ if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return(0);
+ }
i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (i <= 0) goto err;
- p=s;
- sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
+ /* Special case: SSL signature */
+ if(dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ else ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ p=s;
+ sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
- if (sig == NULL) goto err;
- sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
+ if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+ sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
-#ifdef RSA_DEBUG
- /* put a backward compatability flag in EAY */
- fprintf(stderr,"in(%s) expect(%s)\n",OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype),
- OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
-#endif
- if (sigtype != dtype)
- {
- if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
- ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)))
+ #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
+ /* put a backward compatability flag in EAY */
+ fprintf(stderr,"in(%s) expect(%s)\n",OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype),
+ OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
+ #endif
+ if (sigtype != dtype)
{
- /* ok, we will let it through */
-#if !defined(NO_STDIO) && !defined(WIN16)
- fprintf(stderr,"signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
-#endif
+ if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
+ (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
+ ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
+ (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)))
+ {
+ /* ok, we will let it through */
+ #if !defined(NO_STDIO) && !defined(WIN16)
+ fprintf(stderr,"signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
+ #endif
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,
+ RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
- else
+ if ( ((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
+ (memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0))
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
}
- }
- if ( ((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
- (memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- }
- else
- ret=1;
+ else
+ ret=1;
+ }
err:
if (sig != NULL) X509_SIG_free(sig);
memset(s,0,(unsigned int)siglen);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index d3e6b4d..31a8535 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -1053,15 +1053,15 @@ static int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
- i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)n,p,p,pkey->pkey.rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((j != i) || (memcmp(p,md_buf,i) != 0))
+ if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
@@ -1481,11 +1481,9 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),&(data[0]));
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- data,&(p[2]),pkey->pkey.rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &i, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 0cefa09..d722ff3 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1026,9 +1026,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(j,md_buf,&(p[2]),
- pkey->pkey.rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0)
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &i, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
@@ -1449,16 +1448,16 @@ static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
#ifndef NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
- i=RSA_public_decrypt(i,p,p,pkey->pkey.rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((i != (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) ||
- memcmp(&(s->s3->tmp.finish_md[0]),p,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (i == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);